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Introduction
Oliver Evans finally snapped one day in May of 1809. He had been
a patent holder for more than twenty years, reaching back to the years
before the U.S. Constitution and the first federal patent law. For Evans,
these had been two decades of litigation, lobbying, and ceaseless
struggle to promote himself and his flour-milling machines. Now came
the final straw: a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, a past antagonist
of Evans, delivering an opinion “highly damaging to the rights of
inventors” mere days after having declared in court that a patent right
was an “infringement of public right.”1
Evans left his engineering works on Philadelphia’s Vine Street and
went home. He gathered his family and brought out a thick bundle of
papers: all the drawings, specifications, plans, and notes of inventions
that he had not yet put into public use. It was for his family’s own
good, he announced, that he must destroy his work, lest his children
and grandchildren be led into ruin and persecution as he had been. All
burst into tears, before unanimously signaling their assent, and Evans
dumped his inventions into the fire.2
In Evans’s telling, he was the victim of an American patent system
that failed to protect inventors. Having been baited by the promise of
protection, he was at times “thrown into despair” at being “robbed by
law.”3 At one point he publicly renounced further inventive work,
“forced to bury my talent with disgust,” as he put it, “because a patent
in this country is not yet worth the expense of obtaining it.”4 Later
historians sympathized, seeing Evans’s treatment by the courts as
“unfair” handling in what they deemed the law’s “‘Embarrassing’ Era.”5
1.

There are several descriptions of this incident in Evans’s writings. The
quoted language comes from Evans’s private notes made at the time and
reproduced in Greville Bathe & Dorothy Bathe, Oliver Evans: A
Chronicle of Early American Engineering 158 (1935). It is not clear
which opinion of the court so distressed Evans. It may have been offered
after the first argument in Evans v. Weiss, a case that Evans eventually won
but in which the court had initially been “strongly inclined” against him.
See id. (describing the opinion as “delivered but not made final”); Evans v.
Weiss, 8 F. Cas. 888, 889 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 4,572) (“[T]he court at the
last term, and upon the first argument, felt strongly inclined to give it the
construction contended for by the defendant.”).

2.

Id.; Oliver Evans, On Useful Inventions, Nat’l Intelligencer, June 9,
1817.

3.

Oliver Evans, The Young Mill-Wright and Miller’s Guide 373 (2d
ed. 1807).

4.

Id.

5.

Frank D. Prager, Trends and Developments in American Patent Law from
Jefferson to Clifford (1790–1870), part II, 6 Am. J. Legal Hist. 45, 48–49
(1962).
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To many of his contemporaries, though, Evans and his patent
represented quite the opposite. He held a “monopoly” to which the
millers and farmers of the country were “tributary” and which he
deployed for “the oppression of individuals [and] the exaction of
exorbitant sums of money.”6 Evans repeatedly sought and received the
special favor of legislatures, both state and federal. Tellingly, when
Evans publicly retold the story of burning his inventions in despair, he
backdated it three years to 1806—before Congress renewed his most
valuable patent, and before he built a system of licensing and litigation
that spanned much of the country.7
If the complicated birth of United States patent law can be told
through the story of a single figure, that person is Oliver Evans. Evans
was one of the leading inventors and engineers of the early Republic.
He was also its most prominent patentee. Evans’s patenting activities
spanned the Founding: he received patents from four states in the
1780s, and then, after the United States Constitution authorized federal
patents and Congress passed the first patent law in 1790, Evans
obtained the third U.S. patent to be granted.8 His rights became the
subject of sustained executive and congressional politicking, culm–
inating in his grant receiving the first legislative extension of a federal
patent in 1808, three years after it had expired.9 The revived (and
mightily controversial) patent then loomed over both the politics and
the law of the patent system. Evans brought four of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s first six patent cases. And he pioneered large-scale patent
enforcement in the early Republic, creating and directing a multi-state
network of lawyers and agents to assert his rights, as well as issuing
what must surely have been the first demand letter to a sitting U.S.
President. Throughout, the articulate and frequently outraged Evans
was the nation’s leading polemicist for the rights of patentees, damning
the shortcomings of the law and the perfidy of his opponents in letters,
pamphlets, and sarcastic verse.
Even if Evans only served as a Zelig-like figure, repeatedly popping
up at the major waypoints of Founding-era patent history, he would be
6.

Amendment Proposed to the Act Continuing Certain Patent
Rights to Oliver Evans, S. Misc. Doc. No. 13-365, at 237–38 (2d
Sess. 1814).

7.

Compare, e.g., Oliver Evans Memorial to Congress, reprinted in Oliver
Evans, On Useful Inventions, Nat’l Intelligencer, June 9, 1817, at (“At
the age of fifty-one years, despairing of ever receiving any reward from the
public”), with Evans’s private account, reprinted in Bathe & Bathe, supra
note 1, at 158 (“I was then in my 54th year”).

8.

See U.S. Patent Office, A List of Patents Granted by the United States from
April 10, 1790, to December 31, 1836, with an Appendix Containing Reports
on the Condition of the Patent-office in 1823, 1830, and 1931, 4 (Washington,
D.C. 1872).

9.

An Act for the relief of Oliver Evans, ch. 13, 6 Stat. 70, 70–71 (1808).
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a crucial test case for several important historical questions, including
the continuity or discontinuity between the pre-constitutional state and
post-1790 federal regimes, the role played by natural-rights conceptions
of the patent, and the enforceability of inventors’ rights in the early
Republic. But Evans should stand for more than that. The history of
patent law in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was
not, by and large, driven by judicial abstractions or debates of political
principle; instead, it was worked out in practice and shaped by the cases
that came to the fore. And of the concrete contexts in which the patent
right was hammered out, none were more Influential than the cases and
controversies of Oliver Evans.

I. Framing State and Federal Patents
State patents have played little role in recent scrutiny of the
Founding-era patent system. The search for precedent to the
Constitution’s patent clause and to the first patent law more commonly
leads to English antecedents.10 To some extent, this benign neglect is
fair: state patents were a collection of ad hoc legislative grants rather
than a general system of exclusive rights, and they lacked crucial
features of the federal scheme adopted in 1790. But there was more
continuity between the state and federal regimes than first meets the
eye.
Oliver Evans is an ideal candidate to test the connection. As the
holder of four state patents, he enjoyed as much state protection as any
inventor and more than most. And he bridged the constitutional divide:
by obtaining a federal grant in 1790, Evans became the first inventor
to traverse the two regimes.
A.

Engines and Ingenuity

Oliver Evans was born in Newport, Delaware in 1755, the son of a
shoemaker and farmer.11 He was apprenticed in his teens to a
wheelwright and wagonmaker, and it was during this period that he
began both his technical education and his restless mechanical
tinkering. Evans later attributed his interest in steam engineering to a
tale of a local blacksmith’s boy who filled a stopped-up gun barrel with
water and heated the end to produce an explosion: at that moment,
Evans recalled, “[i]t immediately occurred to me that there was a power
10.

See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138
S. Ct. 1365 passim (2018). But—tipping my hand here—see Christopher
Beauchamp, Repealing Patents, 72 Vand. L. Rev. 647, 685 (2019) (arguing
that American law consists of significant departures from English practice,
not just continuation of English practice).

11.

See Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 1–8 (discussing the details of Evans’s
early life); Eugene S. Ferguson, Oliver Evans: Inventive Genius of
the American Industrial Revolution 11–13 (1980).
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capable of propelling any waggon [sic].”12 He later developed an interest
in wire manufacturing and, while laid up from a scythe injury, designed
a machine that would cut and bend the wire teeth used in carding wool
and cotton.13 According to Evans, his short-lived efforts in that area
attracted a mixture of ridicule from his family, a polite rebuff from the
Pennsylvania legislature (which he had approached for a manufacturing
subsidy), and swift copying of his demonstration prototype by the card
manufacturers of Wilmington and Philadelphia.14 Having failed to gain
an inventive foothold, by 1782 he was living at Tuckahoe, on the
Eastern Shore of Maryland, and running a general store with his
younger brother Joseph.15
It was in Maryland that Evans conceived the first elements of the
system for which he would become famous: the mechanized flour mill.
Milling at that time was labor-intensive, hard, and unsanitary work, in
which sacks of wheat were hauled to the top of the mill and progressed
downward through a series of hand-operated processes and waterpowered grindstones.16 Starting in 1783, Evans began to piece together
a series of machines that would collectively form a continuous
automated milling process. The first was an elevator, a series of buckets
on a moving belt that would lift the wheat in place of the traditional
two-man hoist. The second was the “hopperboy”: a rotating rake that
spread, cooled, and dried the ground meal on an upper floor of the mill
while raking it into a hopper for bolting, or sifting. The hopperboy
acquired its name because the job had hitherto been performed by a
boy with a rake.17

12.

Elijah Galloway, History of the Steam Engine, From its First
Invention to the Present Time 93–94 (London, Cowie & Co. 1826).

13.

See Patrick N.I. Elisha, Patent Right Oppression Exposed; or,
Knavery Detected. In an Address, to Unite All Good People to
Obtain a Repeal of the Patent Laws 20–21 (Philadelphia, 2d ed. 1814)
[hereinafter Elisha, Patent Right Oppression] (written by Oliver Evans
under pseudonym).

14.

Id. at 21–23.

15.

See Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 9.

16.

See Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 12; Ferguson, supra note 11, at 12.

17.

See Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 11; Ferguson, supra note 11, at
19–21.
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Evan’s flour mill
illustrated in his
YOUNG MILLWRIGHT AND
MILLER’S GUIDE
(1795)

It was not long before Evans put his designs into practice. He and
two of his brothers had bought a portion of their father’s land near
Newport in 1782, and now constructed a mill at a place called Red Clay
Creek.18 The mill was operative by 1785. Once his system was in place,
Evans tried to interest local millers, but with little success. The
prosperous Quaker millers of Wilmington’s Brandywine Creek were
uninterested, at least in paying Evans for the use of his invention.19
Evans’s later accounts of this period recalled a mixture of clannish
resistance, folksy skepticism (“Oliver, you cannot make water run up
hill, neither can you make [hopper] boys without the help of women.”),
and a calculating refusal to absorb the costs of experimentation.20
Snubbed by the Brandywine millers, Evans turned to a different
audience: the state. His friend George Latimer, a wealthy mill-owner’s
son who had previously supported Evans’s carding-wire venture, was
now a member of the Delaware Assembly. It was Latimer who suggested
that Evans petition the state for an exclusive right to his inventions.21
There was little local precedent: Delaware had never granted a colonial
18.

See Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 12–13.

19.

Ferguson, supra note 11, at 24–25.

20.

Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 156; see also Oliver
Evans, Oliver Evans to His Counsel, Who are Engaged in Defence
of His Patent Rights, for the Improvements he has Invented 9
(n.p. 1817); Ferguson, supra note 11, at 22, 25.

21.

See Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 156–57.
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or state patent for an invention,22 though neighboring Pennsylvania and
Maryland had both done so earlier in 1785, and the rival steamboat
inventors James Rumsey and John Fitch were then noisily campaigning
for state monopolies in the mid-Atlantic states.23 On the other hand,
Latimer’s patronage offered Evans immediate traction with Delaware’s
governing elite. George’s father, James Latimer, had been President of
the convention that framed Delaware’s first state constitution; his
brother Henry had recently been elected to the Continental Congress
and would later serve in the U.S. Congress as Delaware’s representative
and senator.24
With George’s support, Evans petitioned for state protection in
Delaware on January 16, 1786.25 Shortly afterward, he petitioned for
exclusive rights in Maryland and in Pennsylvania, where again George
Latimer lobbied the legislature on his behalf.26 Each state granted a
legislative patent the following year: Pennsylvania in March 1787,27
Maryland in May,28 and Delaware in November.29 Evans added a fourth

22.

See Bruce W. Bugbee, Genesis of American Patent and Copyright
Law 73 (1967).

23.

See id. at 90, 95–97; Frank D. Prager, The Steamboat Pioneers Before the
Founding Fathers, 37 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 486, 486 (1955).

24.

See 2 J. Thomas Scharf, History of Delaware 1609–1888, at 735
(Philadelphia, L.J. Richards & Co. 1888).

25.

See Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 15.

26.

Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 25, 166. A member
of the bi-state “Philadelawarean” elite, George Latimer would move to
Philadelphia in the later 1780s and become speaker of the Pennsylvania
House of Representatives in 1794–98. See John A. Munroe, The
Philadelawareans: A Study in the Relations Between Philadelphia and
Delaware in the Late Eighteenth Century, 69 Pa. Mag. of Hist. &
Biography 128 (1945); George Latimer 1793–1798, Pa. House of
Representatives: House Speaker Biographies, https://www.legis.state
.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/SpeakerBios/SpeakerBio.cfm?id=104 [https://perma.cc
/VVS2-JUYE] (last visited Dec. 12, 2020).

27.

An Act to Grant to Oliver Evans for a Term of Years the Sole and Exclusive
Rights of Making and Selling within this Commonwealth the Machines
Herein Described, in 12 The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania
from 1682 to 1801, at 483–85 (1906) [hereinafter Evans Pennsylvania
Patent].

28.

An Act to Grant to Oliver Evans, for a Term of Years, the Sole and
Exclusive Right of Making and Selling within this State the Machines
Herein Described, 1787 Md. Laws 215 [hereinafter Evans Maryland Patent].

29.

An Act to Grant to Oliver Evans, for a Term of Years, the Sole and
Exclusive Right of Making and Selling within this State the Machines
Herein Described, 2 Del. Laws 915–17 (1787) [hereinafter Evans Delaware
Patent].
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state grant when New Hampshire granted him exclusive rights in
February 1789.30
B.

What Were State Patents?

What were state patents for invention in 1786–1787? They were
not generally called patents, for a start. The statutory grants of the
pre-Constitutional period spoke in terms of “exclusive right” or
“exclusive privilege;” the word “patent” appeared in state statute-books
only in reference to grants of land.31 As exclusive privileges, rights to
invention were not sharply distinguished from other state franchises,
such as exclusive rights granted to the operators of ferries or stage
carriages. Grants for inventions were part of a general impulse towards
support of manufacturing and internal improvements in the new states,
compounded by pressure to stoke domestic industry after postwar
depression struck in 1784,32 and drawing support from skilled urban
workingmen who formed an increasingly organized pro-manufacturing
interest in the second half of the decade.33 State exclusive rights drew
on a scattered tradition of colonial patents for inventions. But they
remained notably ad hoc: with a range of approaches to term,
specification, and remedies for infringement, there are few signs that
the states were tracking practices or developments in the English patent
law of the time.34
We know little about practice under the state patents obtained in
the 1780s, Evans’s patents among them. Historians have found no
record of infringement litigation during the period, and evidence of
financing, licensing, or assignment is scarce.35 The surviving evidence is
limited to matters of form: the form of petitioning for exclusive rights
30.

An Act to Grant to Oliver Evans, for a Term of Years, the Sole and
Exclusive Right of Making and Selling within this State the Machines
Herein Described, in 5 Laws of New Hampshire 401–02 (Henry Harrison
Metcalf ed., 1916) [hereinafter Evans New Hampshire Patent].

31.

Search Results for the Word “Patent” in State Statutes, HeinOnline,
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Welcome (search in HeinOnline for “State
Statutes: A Historical Archive” database; search “patent” within the
database; then limit the date from 1780 to 1787).

32.

See Bugbee, supra note 22, at 84–85.

33.

See, e.g., Charles G. Steffen, The Mechanics of Baltimore: Workers
and Politics in the Age of Revolution 1763–1812, at 81–82 (1984)
(describing the emergence in Baltimore of a “‘mechanic interest’ that no
politician could afford to ignore”).

34.

In one partial exception, state patents gravitated toward the English
fourteen-year patent term. See Bugbee, supra note 22, at 88.

35.

One exception is an apparent profit-sharing agreement between James
Rumsey and James McMechen over the former’s steamboat rights. See
Letters of James Rumsey, Inventor of the Steamboat, 24 Wm. & Mary Q.
Hist. Mag. 154, 168–69 (1916).
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and the forms in which they were granted. Still, these forms are
revealing. The language in which petitioners asked for protection and
the terms in which legislatures answered reveal a good deal about their
respective assumptions and purposes.
Oliver Evans’s Delaware petition is a rare surviving petition for a
state patent.36 Two things are striking about the document. First, the
author did not expect the legislature to apply strict standards of either
novelty or reduction to practice for his inventions. The petition
described Evans’s machine for making card teeth as “perhaps entirely
new.”37 When it came to Evans’s mill machinery, the petitioner des–
cribed himself as “altogether convinced that he can erect the following
Machines (not yet extant).”38
This prospectus-like language may have reflected Evans’s actual
sense that his machines were not yet finished as of January 1786. Or it
may have played to the second prominent feature of the petition: its
insistence that Evans required an incentive to complete the invention.
While the machines in question would “very much lessen the labour
and consequently the expenses of the Milling Business,” Evans
suggested, “the expense and labour attending the inventing, contriving,
and erecting, the above mentioned Machines . . . would exceed any
private emolument likely to be derived to himself, unless he had some
exclusive right to make, and cause to be used, said machines[.]”39 Not
for the last time, Evans argued that the grant of an exclusive right was
a sine qua non, without which his pending inventive work would be
withheld.
Up to this point, Evans’s petitioning fits the prevailing historical
view of state patents as developmental grants, concerned above all with
creating incentives for the introduction of new technology. But the germ
of another perspective began to emerge as Evans grew more confident
in his machinery and his prospects. In January 1787, after a positive
report on his milling inventions by a committee of the legislature, Evans
wrote again to the General Assembly, this time asking that the bill’s
proposed fifteen-year term of exclusivity be lengthened to twenty-five
years.40 Again, he stressed his need for an up-front incentive to bring

36.

The petition is in the collections of the Delaware Historical Society and is
reproduced in its entirety in Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 15.

37.

Id. (emphasis added).

38.

Id.

39.

Id.

40.

See Letter from Oliver Evans to the Delaware General Assembly (Jan. 3,
1787), reprinted in Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 16.
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his technology into use.41 But now Evans began publicly to identify
himself as a distinctive figure—an inventor. “If Providence has endowed
me with a Genius Capable of Invention Probably I may render my
Country greater Services in this than any other line I can engage in,”
he declared, adding that “Nature if attended to will Direct each of us
to the Studies She has adapted us for.”42 A group of Evans’s customers
added a letter of support in similar terms, predicting that Evans would
improve on his machines based on “the Knowledge we have of Your
Petitioners Ginius [sic].”43
Oren Bracha has noted that the idea of the inventor of genius was
promoted by patentees under the new federal patent laws of the 1790s
and early 1800s.44 (The term “genius” was then a capacious term
encompassing innate creative or intellectual capacity; it sometimes,
though not always, carried the connotations of exceptional brilliance
that the word has today). State patents for invention in the 1780s
typically did not dwell on the status of inventors or on the idea of
genius more generally.
Another type of state-conferred right did, however. Most states
adopted copyright statutes between 1783 and 1786 (Delaware was the
one exception),45 and several of these statutes referred to the encour–
agement of “literature and genius.”46 Copyright brought with it a
different set of assumptions about the basis of the grant: in particular,
arguments that the protection of creative works secured the natural
right of the creator in his creation. These assumptions were principally
shaped by the British “literary property” debates of the 1760s and
1770s, in which publishers had sought to push their protection beyond
41.

See id. (“I have concluded that it will not prove to my advantage to proceed
further in these (hitherto) unprofitable Studies untill [sic] I obtain of different
States an exclusive right . . . .”).

42.

Id.

43.

Letter from Caleb Byrnes, Joshua Stroud, James Stroud, Marshall & Stroud,
and William Byrnes to the Delaware General Assembly (Jan. 24, 1787),
reprinted in Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 17.

44.

Oren Bracha, Geniuses and Owners: The Construction of Inventors and the
Emergence of American Intellectual Property, in Transformations of
American Law: Essays in Honor of Professor Morton J. Horwitz
375–77 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009) [hereinafter
Bracha, Geniuses and Owners].

45.

See Oren Bracha, United States Copyright, 1672–1909, in Research Hand–
book on the History of Copyright Law 340–41 (Isabella Alexander &
H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui eds., 2016).

46.

See, e.g., Copyright Enactments of the United States 1783–1906, at
5 (Thorvald Solberg comp., 2nd ed. 1906) (noting a 1783 Connecticut statute,
a 1783 New Hampshire statute, and a 1786 Georgia statute all including in
their name “An act for the encouragement of literature and genius”).
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the scope of statutory copyright by arguing that the author’s natural
right was protected at common law.47 Invoking protection for the fruits
of one’s inventive genius in America in the middle 1780s would have
hinted at a similar framing for inventors’ rights.
Even so, the meshing of these natural-property ideas with exclusive
rights for invention, already discernible in England in the 1770s and
1780s,48 was tentative in the pre-Constitutional United States. The one
state in which a patent made explicit reference to natural right and
inventive genius was South Carolina,49 which was also the only state in
which a patent-granting power appeared as part of the state’s copyright
act.50 Elsewhere, as in Evans’s case, the proposition that inventors were
a class laying special claim to their rights qua creators was an undertone
for now.
The states collectively granted some two dozen patents for
inventions in the years before the Constitution, of which Evans received
four.51 As private acts of the state legislatures, each state patent was a
customized grant, with no two inventors’ rights being exactly alike. On
one day in 1788, for example, South Carolina enacted two patents with
different remedies for infringement, different conditions on the working
or licensing of the inventions, and different disclosure requirements.52
47.

Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: The Intellectual Origins of
American Intellectual Property 1790–1909, at 12, 238–39 (2016)
[hereinafter Bracha, Owning Ideas] (noting that the American state
copyright statutes were justified on the same grounds that English advocates
used to press for common law copyright, and thus were the equivalent of the
1710 Statute of Anne supported by the 1770s English rhetoric of literary
property).

48.

See Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual
History, 1550–1800, 52 Hastings L.J. 1255, 1295–1300 (2001).

49.

See An Ordinance to Secure to Isaac Briggs and William Longstreet, for the
Term of Fourteen Years, the Sole and Exclusive Privilege of Using a Newly
Constructed Steam Engine Invented by Them, in 5 The Statutes at
Large of South Carolina 71–72 (Thomas Cooper ed., 1839) [hereinafter
Briggs & Longstreet Ordinance] (declaring in its preamble that “principles
of natural equity and justice require that authors and inventors should be
secured in receiving the profits that may arise from the sale or disposal of
their respective writings and discoveries, and such security may encourage
men of learning and genius to publish and put in practice such writings and
discoveries as may do honor to their country and service to mankind”).

50.

See Bugbee, supra note 22, at 93.

51.

See Bugbee, supra note 22, at 84–103.

52.

Compare Briggs & Longstreet Ordinance, supra note 49, at 71–72
(stipulating damages for infringement of double the value of every
infringing engine, requiring the inventors to put their engine in practice
within one year, and instructing them to record with the state an “accur–
ate account of the precise principles and construction” of the invention),
with An Act to Invest in Samuel Knight, and his Assigns, the Exclusive
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There was greater standardization for individual inventors across
borders: Evans’s four state grants differed in some respects, but mostly
shared the same language and terms. As such they tell a common story
about how rights were conferred and configured. Given the relatively
scant record of how state patenting worked in practice, it is worth
distilling some of the details of Evans’s grants.
1.

The Granting Process.

Evans’s patents were granted after some process for review and
debate, and perhaps for opposition. In the case of Delaware, for which
the most records of the process survive, Evans’s petition was reviewed
by an appointed committee of the state legislature. The inventor
appeared in person before this committee in January 1787 and,
according to his principal biographers, “explained at great length and
with much detail, the reason why he should be considered the original
inventor of the machines he specified in his petition.”53 Similar
legislative committees reviewed and reported on Evans’s petitions in
Pennsylvania and Maryland.54 The criteria applied by these bodies are
unknown, but Evans did not get everything he asked for. The Delaware
Assembly disregarded most of the machines mentioned in his petition
and granted exclusive rights only for the elevator and hopperboy.55 The
Pennsylvania legislature rejected Evans’s card machines “because they
had got into use” and his milling devices, other than the elevator and
hopperboy, on grounds that the public had earlier use of similar
machinery.56
The states also showed a willingness to reject claims that seemed
excessively speculative. In his Pennsylvania petition, Evans had
included yet another invention: land carriages powered by steam. He
later recalled that the Pennsylvania legislature believed his plan
“visionary” (in a bad way)57 and “treated his memorial as if they
thought him insane.”58 Undeterred, Evans re-petitioned the Delaware
Assembly for a broadly-described “exclusive Right of Propelling all land
Right of Constructing and Vending a Machine for the Pounding of Rice,
for the Term Therein Mentioned, in 5 The Statutes at Large of
South Carolina 69–70 (Thomas Cooper ed., 1839) (setting damages at
fifty pounds sterling per infringement, imposing a compulsory license of
five pounds on demand, and requiring deposit of “an exact plan or model”
of the invention that would be open to public inspection).
53.

Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 17.

54.

Id. at 15, 19.

55.

See Evans Delaware Patent, supra note 29, at 915.

56.

Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 166.

57.

Id.

58.

Id. at 25.
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Carriages by the Power of Steam.”59 This proposal passed the Assembly
but foundered before Delaware’s upper chamber.60 Only in Maryland
was the steam carriage included in his eventual patent.61 It may have
helped that Evans provided a drawing of a model wheel to the Maryland
legislature,62 but it probably mattered more that his steam invention
was recommended by the Baltimore merchant Jesse Hollingsworth, a
legislator and leader of that city’s formidable mechanics’ association.63
2. Purpose.

On their face, Evans’s granted patents stated a functional and
pragmatic rationale. Each declared that his covered inventions “will
greatly tend to simplify, and render cheap, the manufacture of flour,
which is one of the principal staples of this state.”64 (Other than in the
inclusion or exclusion of the steam carriage, the wording of Evans’s
private acts was nearly identical, suggesting that the inventor largely
directed their drafting). Evans received his exclusive rights “in order to
make adequate compensation . . . for his ingenuity, trouble, and
expence [sic].”65 For now, the compensatory language gave no hint of
the arguments from natural right that Evans would later adopt, and
instead answered the main theme of his petitions: that invention was a
costly endeavor.
Notably, the roles of novelty and geography in this quid pro quo
were not always clear. Colonies had granted patents of importation to
those who merely introduced technology from outside; states did too,
and for a while there was debate over whether the federal regime would
do so. Both Delaware and Pennsylvania allowed protection to the
components of Evans’s petitions that had the strongest claim to novelty
and denied the others. Evans made representations during the course
of his petitioning about his original inventorship. But it was not clear,
59.

Petition from Oliver Evans to the Delaware Assembly (May 28, 1787),
reprinted in Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 19. Evans purported to have
“in Various Experiments . . . Invented an entire New Plan of applying said
Powers,” but would not bear the labor or expense of bringing his plan to
completion “without hopes of Considerable profit.” Id.

60.

See Minutes of the Council of the Delaware State, From 1776
to 1792, at 1071–72 (Delaware, James Kirk & Son printers, 1886).

61.

Evans Maryland Patent, supra note 28.

62.

Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 16.

63.

Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 25; Steffen, supra
note 33, at 88.

64.

See, e.g., Evans Delaware Patent, supra note 29, at 915. The Pennsylvania
act substituted “Commonwealth” for “state” and the New Hampshire act
omitted the “staple” clause, but otherwise the language in each state was
identical. See id.; Evans Pennsylvania Patent, supra note 27, at 483–84.

65.

Evans Delaware Patent, supra note 29, at 915–16.
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for example, whether Pennsylvania rejected his carding and grainbreaking machines because they had been used in Pennsylvania, or
because they had been used at all.66 And only Maryland stated in its
granting act that it was a defense to infringement if “it shall be proved
that the said Oliver Evans was not the original inventor of the
machines.”67 It is not a given that lack of novelty would have served as
a defense elsewhere.
3. Scope.

Evans’s state grants had neither specifications nor claims in the
modern sense. The concept of the written disclosure as core of the
patent bargain had emerged most visibly in Britain during the 1770s,
and a few American state patents beginning as early as 1780 had
included a requirement to disclose details of the invention to the public
“in order that no person may unknowingly offend and that all after the
expiration of the term . . . may be enabled to prosecute the said
manufactures to their own advantage.”68 But Evans’s grants contained
only a single sentence describing all of the inventions covered. Instead,
each state’s act declared it infringement to make or sell “any hopperboy or elevator upon the plan of the said Oliver Evans, and constructed
as the said hopper-boy or elevator of the said Oliver Evans is, or in the
form, similitude or likeness thereof.”69
This emphasis on covering the broad principles of operation and
mechanical equivalents was characteristic of state patents. Evans was
actively attempting to persuade millers to adopt his machines, so the
acts did not need to focus on compelling him to disclose the invention.
And the ex ante written definition of the scope of rights seems not to
have been a concern for most state patents. Perhaps, as Herbert
Hovenkamp has suggested, this reflected their background among other
state franchises, such as monopolies and corporate charters, which were
more concerned with mobilizing the franchised activity than they were
with defining the right.70 More likely, patents were simply not yet
conceived primarily in textual terms: the material invention itself
defined the scope of the right, as it would continue to do in some ways
well into the nineteenth century. Mushy ideas of novelty also took the
66.

See Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 166.

67.

Evans Maryland Patent, supra note 28.

68.

An Act to Grant to Henry Guest an Exclusive Right for the Term of Five
Years of Making Oil and Blubber from Materials of his own Discovery, in
10 The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, at 131, 133
(1906); Bugbee, supra note 22, at 87.

69.

Evans Delaware Patent, supra note 29, at 916.

70.

See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent
Law, 58 Ariz. L. Rev. 263, 276–77 (2016).
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pressure off needing to define the invention against the prior art.
Whatever the reasons, the under-definition of Evans’s rights would later
become a great theme of his legal career, and his federal patent would
eventually be instrumental in working out the law of patent scope and
construction.
4. Remedies.

The theory of remedies was unsettled in early American patent acts
generally, with monetary recovery for infringement based variously on
actual damages, on the price of selling or licensing the invention, on
multiples of either of these measures, or on other sums entirely.71 The
Evans patents followed the most common pattern among state grants,
which was to use a fixed penalty set by the granting act.72 In Evans’s
case this was £100 for a first act of infringement, rising to £150 for
repeat offenders.73 To the extent this tells us anything about the state
regime, this “liability rule” protection suggests a taste for easy
administrability and state control of valuation, while still providing a
penalty stiff enough to deter infringement.
5. Cancellation and Working Requirement.

Finally, the states reserved a power to cancel Evans’s rights in
return for a large fixed payment, ranging from £1,000 in Delaware to
£5,000 in Pennsylvania.74 This provision was not common in state
patents but seems to have appeared where state legislatures thought
the invention had a special potential value to the community. James
Rumsey’s steamboat grants from Virginia and Pennsylvania had
included cancellation clauses two years before Evans received his grants,
although the prices set for Rumsey’s rights (£10,000 and £8,000) were
considerably higher.75 New Hampshire further added another
71.

See, e.g., Briggs & Longstreet Ordinance, supra note 49. See generally
Bugbee, supra note 22, at 91–100 (demonstrating differing damages for
patent infringements); Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (“such
damages as shall be assessed by a jury”); Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1
Stat. 318, 322 (“[A] sum, that shall be at least equal to three times the
price, for which the patentee has usually sold or licensed to other persons,
the use of the said invention . . . .”); An Act to extend the privilege of
obtaining patents for useful discoveries and inventions, to certain persons
therein mentioned, and to enlarge and define the penalties for violating the
rights of patentees, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37, 38 (1800) [hereinafter Patent Act
of 1800] (“a sum equal to three times the actual damages sustained.”).

72.

See, e.g., Evans Delaware Patent, supra note 29, at 916–17 (demonstrating
the fixed penalties set by each act).

73.

See id.

74.

See id. at 916; Evans Pennsylvania Patent, supra note 27, at 484.

75.

See Bugbee, supra note 22, at 96–97.
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reservation in favor of the public, this one also present in some of the
state steamboat patents: what would now be called a “working require–
ment,” making Evans’s rights conditional on a builder of his machines
residing in New Hampshire within a year of the grant and throughout
its seven year term.76
Evans had little opportunity to test his state patents. After
receiving his mid-Atlantic grants, Oliver sent his brother Joseph Evans
on a grand tour of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania,
promoting his machines and seeking adopters. Despite offering a free
license to the first miller in each county to employ the system, Joseph
had no takers.77 Though discouraged, Oliver continued to develop the
automated flour mill, filling out his system with three more grainhandling machines: the conveyer (a kind of Archimedes screw); the drill
(a segmented belt used for horizontal movement); and the descender (a
gravity-operated belt for downward transport).78 Finally, during 1789,
Evans found a customer progressive enough to adopt his system and
prominent enough to impress other millers. This was Jonathan Ellicott,
then head of the Ellicott family of wealthy Quaker millers who operated
large mills on the Patapsco River near Baltimore. “I have never been
with so ingenious a family,” Evans wrote in his diary of his visit to the
Ellicott mills.79 Ellicott apparently received his license gratis under the
Maryland patent.80 It was among the last work that Evans’s state grants
would do. The following year, Evans would replace them with a federal
patent.
C.

From State to Federal

The federal Patent Act of 1790 was different in many ways from
the state grants of exclusive rights. In place of a legislative regime, the
act established a board of cabinet-level officials—the Secretaries of
State and War and the Attorney General—empowered to grant
patents.81 It also standardized requirements of novelty and disclosure,
set a maximum (and in practice, standard) term of fourteen years, and
dictated remedies for infringement and a process for challenging invalid
grants.82 For all the differences between state and federal regimes,
though, the inputs were strikingly similar. When Oliver Evans became
76.

See Evans New Hampshire Patent, supra note 30, at 401.

77.

Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 31–32.

78.

Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 13–14; Ferguson, supra note 11, at 25–
26.

79.

Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 23 n.30.

80.

Id. at 21.

81.

See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110.

82.

See id. § 1–2, 4–5.
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the first to cross the threshold from state to federal protection, he
encountered a familiar process for obtaining the grant. Indeed, it was
his and his examiners’ lack of adaptation to new forms or formalities
that would later break his first federal patent.
The common thread of state and early federal regimes was their
basis in petitioning. While the United States in 1790 had set up a
general patent law open to all applicants, it retained the character of
petition-based, direct-access government in both its origins and
working. Indeed, the patent system should be set in the context of a
federal government that, from its beginning, functioned in large part
through direct petitioning to Congress.83 Private bills; petitions for
relief, pensions, and compensation; the grievances of local communities
and their requests for infrastructural development and industrial
policy—these were the stuff of much legislative life in the early
Congresses. The 1790 patent law came about in large part because
Congress was already being pelted with petitions for federal patents.84
As the legislature worked to set up an infrastructure for addressing
petitions in general, the Patent Act was a prominent example of how
Congress began to channel the stream of requests into formal evaluation
processes.85
Evans began to seek federal protection in May of 1790, barely a
month after the passage of the Patent Act.86 The documentary record
of his first federal patent is, alas, almost nil. The Patent Office fire of
1836 destroyed most records from before that date, leaving only
scattered examples from which to reconstruct early practice.
From such circumstantial and indirect evidence as we have, though,
it seems that both Evans’s petition and issued patents may have been
more akin to state forms than to later U.S. patents. Like his state grants

83.

See Maggie McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative
State, 127 Yale L.J. 1538, 1565 (2018).

84.

See generally Proceedings in Congress During the Years 1789 and 1790,
Relating to the First Patent and Copyright Laws, 22 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y
243 (1940) (documenting the many federal patent petitions Congress
received in 1789–90); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the
Progress of Useful Arts: American Patent Law and Admin–
istration, 1790–1836, at 115–17 (1998).

85.

See McKinley, supra note 83, at 1565.

86.

Walterscheid, supra note 84, at 176. Acquiring a national right was by
no means automatic: most holders of state exclusive rights did not receive
federal patents, at least not for the same inventions, though the most
prolific state patentees—Evans and the steamboat inventors John Fitch
and James Rumsey—all did. At least three other state patentees later
received federal rights for inventions distinct from their state grants: the
clockmaker Robert Leslie of Philadelphia, the New Englander Benjamin
Dearborn, and Henry Guest of New Jersey.
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and other early federal petitions,87 Evans’s petition sought protection
for multiple machines, in his case described collectively as an “improve–
ment in manufacturing wheat into flour.”88 How much detail the
petition contained is not clear, but the few surviving petitions from this
period were relatively brief and largely devoted to impressing on the
board the value (rather than the novelty or technical details) of the
invention.89 At least one of them, an unsuccessful petition by Evans
himself for a steam-carriage patent in 1792, contained only a single
paragraph of description.90 In any event, Evans was expected
subsequently to appear in support of his flour-milling claim, as he had
done before the state legislative committees. In June 1790, he appeared
before the board and “was requested to prepare drawings of his
machines and when ready to give information.”91
The signed and sealed patents emerging from this process were no
more informative. Surviving patents from the 1790 regime adopt a oneparagraph format, naming the inventor and providing only a summary
description.92 To be sure, the statute required that a patentee file an
enabling specification with the Secretary of State at the time the patent
was granted, and the board eventually began to insist that
“specification[s], . . . drafts or models” form part of the application.93
But in Evans’s case, those formalities seem to have broken down.
Historical accounts have sometimes assumed that the patent received
by Evans in January 179194—the third federal patent issued—was the
same as that allowed to him by Act of Congress in 1808, the so-called
“Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans”95 that granted him a new fourteen87.

Walterscheid, supra note 84, at 176–77.

88.

The register of petitions records Evans’s subject matter as “an improvement
in manufacturing wheat into flour, called ‘the art of elevating wheat and
meal from the lower to the upper stories, and of conveying it from any one
part to another of the mill, and of spreading the meal to cool, and gathering
it again, and of attending the boulting hopper, all without the aid of manual
labor.’” Walterscheid, supra note 84, at 176.

89.

See Bracha, Owning Ideas, supra note 47, at 196–98.

90.

See Petition from Oliver Evans to the Patent Board, [ca. 1 Dec. 1792],
reprinted in 24 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 683–84 (John
Catanzariti ed., 1990).

91.

Walterscheid, supra note 84, at 179.

92.

Walterscheid, supra note 84, at 181–82.

93.

Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110–11; Walterscheid, supra
note 84, at 180–81.

94.

The patent was granted on December 18, 1790 but received by Evans only
on January 7, 1791. P.J. Federico, The Patent Trials of Oliver Evans: Part
I, 27 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 586, 589–90 (1945).

95.

Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans, ch. 13, 6 Stat. 70, 70–71 (1808).
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year term three years after his first expired. But that assumption seems
unsafe.96
The best evidence we have of Evans’s documentary patent record
may be a judicial decision that was not rendered until after the 1790
patent expired.97 It depicts a rather slapdash process. The petition and
specification did not match up with the issued patent, which included
“the elevators, and other parts of the mill machinery, except, that the
use of the hopperboy is incidentally mentioned; without any description
of its use, and the manner in which it is to work.”98 Worse still, the
only mention of the hopperboy in the patent was interlined, as though
added after the fact. And the patent itself had not been recorded,
despite delivery to Evans.99 Looking back even from the first decade of
the nineteenth century, Evans’s federal grant seemed inadequate and
irregular—a patent of the ancien regime.

II. Patronage, Property, and Politics
The acquisition of a federal patent was Evans’s first contact with
Thomas Jefferson, who as Secretary of State and a member of the
patent board oversaw his successful petition and signed his patent.100
Within a year, Evans was building a mill for the patent’s other
signatory, President George Washington.101 Proximity to federal gov–
ernment patronage was the recurring theme of Evans’s life as a
patentee, for both better and worse.
During the first two decades of the nineteenth century, Evans’s
milling patent was before Congress, the courts, and the public more
than any other. Along with Evans’s self-appointed role as the advocate
of inventors, this meant that discussion of patents in the political sphere
revolved substantially around Oliver Evans and his works. Evans and
his opponents generated a stream of assertions about the nature of
patent rights, cycling through different theories of desert, property, and
social utility as they did so.

96.

Pursuant to the Act, Evans submitted a new petition for a patent to the
Secretary of State in conformity with the Patent Act of 1793, attaching a
fresh specification at that time and not simply incorporating by reference
his 1790 grant. See id. at 70. (authorizing a patent “to be made out in the
manner prescribed by” the later Patent Act); Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S.
454, 508–09 (1818).

97.

See Evans v. Chambers, 8 F. Cas. 837 (C.C.D. Pa. 1807) (No. 4,555).

98.

Id. at 838.

99.

See id. at 837.

100. Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 25.
101. See id. at 25–27.
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A.

Inventor and Author

There was truth to Evans’s later claims that his initial patent term
did not reward him. For Evans, the 1790s were a struggle to promote
his mill inventions. The early 1800s saw his technology gain momentum,
only for enforcement of the patent to fail.
For all that he was later criticized as a monopolist, Evans was a
frantic disseminator of his invention. He claimed years afterward that
he and his agents had travelled “thousands” of miles promoting his mill
machinery.102 Their efforts were not entirely futile. By one estimate,
more than a hundred mills had adopted his machines by 1792.103 Even
so, the opposition of the Brandywine millers delayed uptake by others
and was a subject of bitter resentment by the inventor.104
Evans’s response was to scale up promotion by another route: the
publication of a book outlining his inventions alongside some basic
principles of mill engineering. This work, The Young Mill-Wright and
Miller’s Guide, would far outlive Evans and his patents. First published
in 1795, it continued to appear in subsequent editions until 1860, and
was long considered a standard engineering reference work.105 It is worth
appreciating that Evans was able to publicize the design of his invention
aggressively because he possessed a patent for it: freed from the need
to hold his know-how close, he made the book the centerpiece of a
proselytizing strategy.106 But this was not an immediately rewarding
path. Evans the author was consumed by his writing in the mid-1790s,
to the exclusion of other business. The book grew uncontrollably in
density and detail, gradually reducing Evans to such financial precarity
that his wife Sarah had to sell the cloth she had spun for their children’s
clothing in order to buy bread.107 An appeal to the Pennsylvania
legislature for a subsidy (Evans had relocated to Philadelphia in 1792)
was in vain, and only rescue by a wealthy benefactor allowed the book
to reach publication.108
After these thin years, Evans’s prospects began to improve. His
patent licensing operation was extensive enough that his agents used a

102. Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 34–34.
103. See Ferguson, supra note 11, at 29.
104. Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 34–35.
105. Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 47.
106. See Oliver Evans, Address of the Advocate of the Patentees,
Inventors of Useful Improvements in the Arts and Sciences 12
(Washington City, Duane & Son 1806) [hereinafter Evans, Useful
Improvements].
107. See Evans, supra note 20, at 16.
108. Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 45–47.
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standard printed form to record licenses.109 Although he often
complained that revenues barely covered the cost of collection, Evans
eventually made “small clear proceeds” on his milling patent, which he
ploughed back into his work in steam engineering.110
It was not lost on the perpetually disappointed Evans that his rights
started to turn a profit just as his patent term approached its end. As
its fourteen-year term expired, Evans adopted two strategies to prolong
the reward. One was litigation. Evans did not engage in much if any
infringement litigation during the 1790s.111 But beginning in 1804,
Evans initiated a wave of suits in the U.S. Circuit Court (then a trial
court) in Philadelphia: the first against Benjamin Chambers, a miller
from Western Pennsylvania, followed by at least eleven more in 1805.112
The Chambers case would not be decided until 1807, at which point it
would both kill off the Evans patent and inadvertently cause it to rise,
phoenix-like, from the flames. In the meantime, Evans pursued a second
goal: the extension of the patent by Congress.
Evans now entered the phase of his public career that was
dominated by patent lobbying. As an inventor and businessman, his
concerns were focused on steam engineering, and he thought of the
revenues from the milling patent principally as a source of funding for
his steam experiments. It was in these terms that he first attempted to
interest Congress in a patent extension. Over the next two years,
though, as his frustration with Congress grew, Evans developed a range
of arguments for his own interest and that of inventors and patentees
generally.
B.

Justifying Patents: Right, Reward, and Relief

Histories of the early American patent system tend to describe the
available theories of the patent during this period in a binary way.
Patents were either utilitarian tools granted to encourage invention, or
they were based on the natural right of the inventor to the fruits of his
labor. Most accounts are comfortable saying that these conceptions of
the patent were complementary and coexistent, which is true. But the
arguments of Evans and others show a greater diversity of
justifications—some of which resist or escape the binary framing—and
the ways in which they were addressed to different audiences.
109. Id. at 160 app. plate 31.
110. Evans, Useful Improvements, supra note 106, at 12.
111. The grounds and fate of an isolated 1795 suit filed against James Sterret,
a mill owner from Erie County, are not known. See National Archives,
Law and Appellate Records of the U.S. Circuit Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, 1790–1847, Microfilm Publication M969 (listing
among the archived case files Oliver Evans v. James Sterret et al., October
Term 1795).
112. Id.
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Roughly speaking, there were four frames for justifying the
inventor’s right. One was a purely incentive-based or consequentialist
argument, in which the purpose and benefits of the patent system were
expressed solely in terms of mobilizing inventive efforts for the ends of
social welfare. The text of the 1790 Patent Act provided perhaps the
sparest statement of these ends: the Act’s one substantive charge to the
eminences of the patent board was to grant a patent “if they shall deem
the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important.”113
An alternative (though not necessarily mutually exclusive) framing
took the form of arguments from “natural justice” or “mental property,”
which adopted the theory from common law copyright and the literary
property debates that the creator possessed a natural property right in
the fruits of his mental labor. These ideas too were present at the
creation, with South Carolina’s state patent law, the only general
patent provision enacted by a state before the Constitution, recognizing
the natural justice of the inventor’s cause, and some early advocates for
patentees in the 1790s advancing arguments from mental property.114
In between these two perspectives were two other justifications for
granting or strengthening the patent privilege. One was a compensatory
or reward theory, in which inventors were to be rewarded after the fact
for their costs and efforts, based on their service to the public. This was
not a purely utility-maximizing argument directed to the generation of
further inventions (or the “promotion of progress in the useful arts”),
in that it focused intensely on the desert of the inventor—the private
reward rather than the public good. At the same time, it was not
inherently an argument from natural right or mental property, since it
was entirely compatible with the grant being a discretionary one; not
an entitlement but something more like a bounty, a gratuity, or a debt.
This was the tenor of most of the pre-1790 state patents: Oliver Evans’s
grants, after all, spoke of “adequate compensation . . . for his ingenuity,
trouble and expense,”115 and the same concept continued into the first
federal regime.
The compensatory view of patents may seem, to us, strangely
retrospective. The modern incentive theory of patents sees the social
benefit of patent protection as prospective and dynamic: people will
incur the costs of time and money necessary for invention because they
expect to be able to appropriate a return on the invention. From
society’s point of view, granting an exclusive right to inventions already
made is simply the cost of doing business—a means to the end of future
innovation, rather than a social obligation to the past inventor per se.
113. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110.
114. Bracha, Geniuses and Owners, supra note 44, at 375–77.
115. See, e.g., Evans Pennsylvania Patent, supra note 27, at 484; see also supra
notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
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By contrast, the compensatory view of Evans’s time focused very much
on what the inventor was owed by the community. In doing so, it fit
more than one logic of the early Republic. First, it carried the note of
duty or obligation in what was still fundamentally an honor culture.116
Pennsylvania state patents had described the grant in exactly those
terms, calling it “consistent with the honor of this state to reward the
inventors of useful improvements.”117 Second, it fit the governing
institutions of a polity that compensated many providers of public
services on a bounty basis.118 Naval officers and privateers took prizes
and received bounties for capture; law officers were paid for arrests.
Pensions for service in the Revolutionary War were a central topic of
federal petitioning in the early Republic.119 After-the-fact compensation
for efforts mobilized to the public good was a basic and pragmatic tool
of American government well into the nineteenth century.
The final frame, of which Oliver Evans became the supreme
practitioner, was the argument for relief. In this view, inventors were
an oppressed, victimized, and downtrodden class crying out for public
aid. Again, this appeal fit a core category of governmental activity in
the early Republic. Congress granted debt relief and tax remission, aid
to those affected by natural disasters, and relief to the victims of
maladministration.120 The constant stream of petitions to Congress for
116. See, e.g., Joanne B. Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics
in the New Republic, at xxi–xxii (2001) (discussing motivations of early
American politics through an honor culture framework).
117. An Act [for] Granting unto George Wall, Junior, the Sole and Exclusive
Privilege of Making and Vending a Mathematical Instrument by Him
Invented for the Term of Twenty-One Years, in 12 The Statutes at
Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, at 495 (1906); see also An
Act to Grant to Arthur Donaldson, His Executors, Administrators and
Assigns, the Exclusive Right of Making and Using in the River Delaware a
Machine Called Hippopotamos by Him Invented, for the Cleansing of Docks
and Raising Sand, Gravel, Dirt and Other Things from the Bed of the River,
in 12 The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801,
at 411–12 (1906) (“And whereas it is consistent with the honor of this state
to reward the inventors of useful machines and the most rational and just
mode of such reward is and ought to be the exclusive advantage resulting
from the invention for a term of years[.]”).
118. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Against the Profit Motive: The Salary
Revolution in American Government, 1780–1940, at 3 (2013)
(“[B]ounties, ever since the Middle Ages, had held great promise as
instruments to vindicate the directives of the sovereign . . . .”) (describing
the nineteenth-century transition of American government from profitseeking to salaried officers).
119. Id. at 1, 145–46.
120. See Michele Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State: Disaster
Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State, 17–18
(2013); Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Consti–
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relief via private acts had lists of signatories ranging from one to
thousands.121 As with each of the other justifications for support of
inventors’ rights, the relief argument blended easily with other prin–
ciples. The wrong done to inventors, for example, might be the
misappropriation of their mental property (a natural rights emphasis),
or it might be their monetary loss on their experimental efforts (a
compensatory rationale). All the same, the relief framing represented a
distinct type of claim on government.
Evans’s first petition to Congress for an extension of the milling
patent was thoroughly prospective and consequentialist. According to
the report of the House Committee to which it was referred, Evans
sought an extension “with a view that he may appropriate the proceeds
towards completing his further inventions on steam engines.”122 The
committee considered that “if he could be encouraged to persevere, it
is highly probable his discoveries may be rendered useful to his country,
and at the same time profitable, and honorable to himself.”123 Evans
was optimistic about his extension, and wrote to Thomas Jefferson, now
President, to affirm that an additional term would support his “expen–
sive experiments in persuit [sic] of other useful improvements.”124 The
committee’s report recommended drafting legislation to allow patent
and copyright extensions generally,125 but Congress did not pursue the
idea.
Evans petitioned again a year later, in December 1805, and this
petition was again coldly transactional.126 In dispassionately relating the
limited returns under his 1790 patent, Evans noted that “he has already
expended more than the nett [sic] profits arising from his invention” in
spending $3,700 on steam engine research.127 After gesturing towards
his “sanguine expectations” of labor savings worth 100,000 men, Evans
gave an itemized budget for spending the anticipated returns on an
extended patent term: $3,000 each for introducing steam engines, for
further experiments, and for publishing a “Young Steam Engineer’s
tution: The Lost One Hundred Years of American Administrative
Law 122 (2012).
121. See McKinley, supra note 83, at 1562 n.106 (citing 8 Documentary
History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of
America, 4 March 1789–3 March 1791, at xix–xx (Kenneth R. Bowling
et al. eds., 1998)).
122. Oliver Evans, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 8-128, at 1002–03 (2d Sess. 1805).
123. Id.
124. Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 160 app. plate 31.
125. Oliver Evans, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 8-128, at 1002–03 (2d Sess. 1805).
126. Application of Oliver Evans for an Extension of his Patent, H.R.
Misc. Doc. No. 9-196 (1st Sess. 1805).
127. Id.
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Guide.”128 He concluded with the explicit quid pro quo: “your petitioner,
on his part, promises faithfully to exert his abilities to bring to
perfection and into use his said improvements.”129 Again, Congress
failed to act.
When Evans returned to his cause for a third time late in 1806, his
tone and his arguments were very different. He now came not for
himself alone, but in concert with other inventors and patentees who
had petitioned Congress for longer patent terms. Now his arguments
were addressed more sharply to the needs of inventors as a class. On
December 13, Evans wrote to President Jefferson that he was making
his “last effort to draw the attention of the legislature . . . to the
oppressed and aggrieved state of the men of inventive genius of this
country who are generally made so poor by their pursuits,” and whose
patents were so short-lived that they left inventors “in poverty and
distress.”130 Reminding the President “that genius produces science and
art, science and art produce agriculture, manufactures and commerce,”
Evans described his advocacy for inventors in overheated terms: “not
only the wealth and power of the nation but the happiness of millions
yet unborn yes the very existence of millions depend on my success or
on the measures to be adopted by Congress.”131
One week later, Evans appeared before a congressional committee
empaneled to consider the patent term. He presented himself on behalf
of “the patentees, inventors of useful improvements, who have
petitioned Congress for redress of grievances . . . in defence of mental
property.”132 In this vivid speech, quickly published for wider circ–
ulation, Evans declared that:
Men of genius, in this country, are of all others least protected;
they are slighted, embarrassed, and abused . . . .
. . . [W]e are at the mercy of the rest of the community—an
enslaved, oppressed, dependant [sic] class, amidst a free,
enlightened, and independant [sic] people; held dependant on the
will of the legislature of the nation, for the privilege of enjoying
exclusively the fruits of our own labors . . . .133

In a departure of both style and substance from his past
congressional pleas, Evans now embraced the natural-right conception
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Letter from Oliver Evans to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 13, 1806), reprinted
in Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 127.
131. Id.
132. Evans, Useful Improvements, supra note 106, at 3.
133. Id. at 4.
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of an inventor’s mental property. He insisted “[t]hat men of genius are
as justly entitled to protection . . . of the fruits of the labors of the
mind . . . as any are in the possession of real or personal property.”134
His central objective in making this argument was—as it had been for
the proponents of common law copyright in Britain’s literary property
debates—to argue for a perpetual term. Taking rhetorical aim at the
framers of the Constitution, Evans demanded to know “What sort of
right is this, which is entitled to be secured for a limited time only? . . .
[W]hy not delegate to Congress the power to secure the right forever,
to this, as well as any other property?”135 If not a perpetual right, he
suggested, then three generations or at least a fifty-year term would
serve.136 Finally, Evans built to a mighty climax on the benefits of
perpetual patents to the nation. From the inventor thus secured,
others catch the sacred flame, and engage in the same pursuit,
with like success—genius, no longer held in contempt, is
esteemed . . . persecution, abuse and robbery cease, because
means of defence [sic] appear . . . .
The tide of genius flowing over our happy country, turning
dry and barren wastes into fruitful fields, and enlivened by the
cheering sun, refreshing rains, and gentle zephyrs of possession
and enjoyment of rights, would bring forth flowers and fruits of
useful discoveries and improvements in science and the arts, in
abundance, which are now locked in embryo, by the cold north
winds of disappointment, poverty, and despair.137

As before, Evans’s lobbying fell on deaf ears. It may not have
consoled him that a patentee interest began to emerge and organize in
his wake. In 1807, Benjamin Dearborn, a fellow state-turned-federal
patentee, founded the Newengland Association of Inventors and
Patrons of Useful Arts, which during its short existence similarly
extolled the inventor of genius.138
By that time, though, Evans was grappling with one more setback
of his own. The belated test case on Evans’s patent, Evans v. Chambers,
finally came to a head in 1807.139 At argument in the U.S. Circuit Court
134. Id. at 16.
135. Id. at 9.
136. See id. at 10.
137. Id. at 14–15.
138. See, e.g., Remarks on the Rights of Inventors, and the Influence
of Their Studies in Promoting the Enjoyments of Life, and Public
Prosperity (Boston, E. Lincoln 1807) (discussing the burdens of inventors
and their unfair treatment under the law and in society).
139. 8 F. Cas. 837 (C.C.D. Pa. 1807) (No. 4,555).
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in Philadelphia, Evans suffered a nasty reversal of fortune before
Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington and District Judge
Richard Peters. Defendant’s counsel challenged the validity of the 1790
patent based on formalities—among other things, the failure of the
patent document itself to include the hopperboy recited in the
petition.140 Evans’s counsel protested vehemently in open court, but
privately advised Evans that they should find a way to stall the case
lest the judges invalidate the grant.141
Evans immediately wrote to Thomas Jefferson in distress, fretting
that invalidity would subject him to suit from all the licensees from
whom he had taken money, “which would [lead] to my utter ruin.”142
The President wrote back to assure him that if the “high officers” of
the patent board—of which Jefferson had been one at the time—had
failed to ensure the patent complied with the statute, “their negligence
cannot invalidate the inventor’s right who has been guilty of no
fault.”143 But it was too late: Justice Washington deemed the objection
“not to be gotten over.”144
Ironically, Washington’s nullification of the expired patent accom–
plished what all Evans’s lobbying could not: a legislative restoration of
the grant. With support from Jefferson, and with a letter from Secretary
of State James Madison “stating his unwillingness to accept the decision
of the Circuit Court,”145 Evans petitioned Congress once more. The
resulting “Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans” allowed Evans to seek,
and the Secretary of State to grant, a patent for his invention for an
additional fourteen-year term beginning in 1808.146 Now Evans held a
patent that was good until 1822, and he would test the patent law as
it had not been tested before.

140. Id. at 838.
141. See Letter from Oliver Evans to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 18, 1807) (on file
with National Archives), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Jefferson/99-01-02-5472 [https://perma.cc/P3Z4-LL5S] (“Mr [sic] Rawle
advised me as a prudent step to consent that he should propose the
opposite counsel to withdraw a Juror and let the cause lay over untill [sic]
the next term stating that he was apprehensive that the court would
decide against the validity of the patent . . . .”).
142. Id.
143. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans (May 2, 1807) (on file with
National Archives), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/
99-01-02-5538 [https://perma.cc/7K7Z-JRLA].
144. Chambers, 8 F. Cas. at 838.
145. Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 132.
146. Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans, ch. 13, 6 Stat. 70 (Jan. 21, 1808).
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III. Marshall, Jefferson, and the Property Question
In October of 1808, a merchant named John Moody called at
Jefferson’s Virginia plantations. Jefferson was away in the capital and
the current occupants of his mill could give Moody no information, so
Moody wrote the first patent demand letter to a sitting President of
the United States.147 As agent of Oliver Evans, he explained, he had
been employed “to Settle his Business with The Millars. Respecting
thier useing his Improovements for Manufacturg flour without a
Licence.”148 Jefferson could rightly consider himself a benefactor of
Evans, having signed the act to extend Evans’s patent nine months
earlier. What’s more, Jefferson did not believe himself liable, because
his mill had been built after the original patent expired in 1804 and
before the 1808 renewal. But if the President’s feathers were ruffled, he
did not show it. Jefferson agreed to pay the requested license fee
“willingly as a voluntary tribute to a person whose talents are
constantly employed in endeavors to be useful to mankind, and not as
a legal obligation.”149
Far from ending Evans’s political struggles, the extension of his
patent heightened the stakes and the controversy surrounding his
rights. First, Evans announced his intention to increase license fees
dramatically.150 This act aroused the collective ire of the millers,
creating a powerful lobby against the patent. Second, Congress’s
resurrection of the expired patent raised a thorny question about all the
millowners who, like Jefferson, had adopted Evans’s system after the
end of his original term. The act had included a proviso explicitly
barring liability for any person “who shall have used the said
improvements, or have erected the same for use, before the issuing of
the said [second] patent.”151 But did that merely cover activity in the
147. Letter from John Moody to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 20, 1808) (on file with
National Archives).
148. Id.
149. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Moody (Oct. 26, 1808) (on file with
National Archives), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/
99-01-02-8907 [https://perma.cc/VFK4-N3WK].
150. Letter from Oliver Evans for all the Newspapers in the United States (Apr.
20, 1810), reprinted in Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 167–68; see also
Evans, Oliver Evans to His Counsel, supra note 20, at 30–32 (discussing
the value of licensing his patents).
151. Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans, ch. 13, 6 Stat. 70, 71 (Jan. 21, 1808)
(“Provided, That no person who may have heretofore paid the said Oliver
Evans for license to use his said improvements shall be obliged to renew
said license, or be subject to damages for not renewing the same: And
provided also, That no person who shall have used the said improvements,
or have erected the same for use, before the issuing of the said patent, shall
be liable to damages therefor.”).
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gap between the first and second terms, or did it permanently exempt
all mills built during that period?
These two sources of vexation in turn produced a split between
Founding Fathers over the nature of property in invention. In the
courts, Chief Justice John Marshall rendered the principal judicial
opinion now cited as support for a propertarian conception of patents
in the early Republic.152 At the same time, in the public sphere, former
President Thomas Jefferson penned what is now the most famous
pronouncement against the natural-property vision of patents: his 1813
letter to the Baltimore miller Isaac McPherson.153 Neither is quite what
it seems.
A.

Marshall and the Inchoate Right

What was the nature of an inventor’s right in his invention? Did it
depend on the existence of a patent, or did it precede the grant of legal
exclusivity? How did it relate to the rights of the public? All these
questions were forced to the forefront by the unusual circumstances of
Evans’s renewed patent. Many alleged infringers had (or claimed they
had) set up their mills in the period between his first and second grants.
When sued, these defendants argued that the Act for the Relief of
Oliver Evans was an unconstitutional ex post facto law, exposing them
to liability on investments made before its passage.154 Evans’s lawyers
responded that what really mattered was not the date of the patent,
but the date of invention: the inventor’s rights, while perfected and
given the protection of positive law by the patent of 1808, nevertheless
stemmed from his act of invention itself, and thus preceded the
defendant’s activities, even for mills set up before the patent.155 It was
a short hop from that argument to a contention that inventors in
general possessed a pre-patent right.
The first part of this move is demonstrated by Evans v. Weiss, the
first case applying Evans’s rights to a mill built before the 1808
152. Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 4,564). See Adam
Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents?
Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 Cornell L.
Rev. 953, 995 (2007) [hereinafter Mossoff, Who Cares]; Oil States Energy
Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1384 (2018).
153. See Mossoff, Who Cares, supra note 152, at 960–67 (relating the elevation
of Jefferson’s letter by scholars and the courts); Jeremy N. Sheff, Jefferson’s
Taper, 73 SMU L. Rev. 299, 301 (2020) (referring to the letter as “part of
the fundamental lore of American intellectual property (IP) law”).
154. See, e.g., Jordan, 8 F. Cas. at 873 (reporting suit from Evans after defen–
dants begin manufacturing machinery covered by Evans’s expired patent
before he had received the extension); Evans v. Weiss, 8 F. Cas. 888, 889
(C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 4,572) (bringing suit after defendants produced
Evan’s machinery during a time where the patent was expired).
155. Weiss, 8 F. Cas. at 889.
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patent.156 Justice Bushrod Washington, presiding in the Circuit Court
in Philadelphia, rejected the ex post facto argument “because the
general [patent] law declares, beforehand, that the right to the patent
belongs to him who is the first inventor, even before the patent is
granted.”157 Any person who constructed a machine invented by another
thus assumed the risk that the earlier inventor would obtain a patent
and “cut him out of the use of the machine thus erected.”158
Washington’s opinion was, in essence, a restatement of the first-toinvent patent regime: that the first inventor, and only he, had the right
to obtain a patent on the device in question.
Chief Justice John Marshall expanded on the point in Evans v.
Jordan, decided in the U.S. Circuit Court of Virginia in June 1813.159
Describing the first inventor’s exclusive right to obtain a patent,
Marshall proclaimed:
The constitution and law, taken together, give to the inventor,
from the moment of invention, an inchoate property therein,
which is completed by suing out a patent. This inchoate right is
exclusive. It can be invaded or impaired by no person. No person
can, without the consent of the inventor, acquire a property in
the invention. Whenever, then, previous to a patent, any person
constructs a machine discovered by another, he constructs it
subject to the right of that other.160

Marshall proceeded to explain why this prevented him from
construing the Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans as an ex post facto
law. Like any first inventor, Evans had gained an “inchoate and
indefeasible property in the thing discovered [which] commences with
the discovery itself, and is only perfected by the patent.”161 Thus
Congress in granting that patent was not retroactively invading “sacred
rights of property”—meaning the property rights of those who had built
the machine before the grant.162 The statute’s proviso protected only
activities taking place before the grant of the renewed patent, and the
“plain meaning” of the act did not need to be twisted to give mills built
during that period a permanent exemption.163

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 889–90.
159. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. at 872.
160. Id. at 873.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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It is important to note that, when Marshall wrote of the inventor’s
“inchoate and indefeasible property,” he did not associate it with Oliver
Evans’s oft-made claim that the patent protected an inventor’s natural
right in his labor. The property outlined by Marshall was a right of
priority, exclusively capable of ripening into a patent—it arose with the
invention, but did so by virtue of first possession, not genius; it derived
from “the constitution and law,” not natural right.164
The other little-known feature of Marshall’s opinion in Evans v.
Jordan is that half the court disagreed. The U.S. Circuit Court was a
two-judge affair, with Marshall sitting alongside U.S. District Judge St.
George Tucker.165 Tucker, the author/editor of the leading American
legal treatise (Tucker’s edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries), was
scarcely less of an authority than Marshall.166 He wrote no published
dissent in Evans v. Jordan, but certified the division of opinion—
sending the case by right to the U.S. Supreme Court167—and prepared
a memorandum opinion that survives in Marshall’s papers.168
Tucker saw the matter not in terms of the inventor’s pre-patent
property, but of the public’s post-patent right. “In Conference with
Judge Marshall,” he wrote:
I made the following Observations to him.
The Objects of the C[onstitution of the] U[nited] S[tates] & of
the Patent Laws, is two fold.
1. To secure to Inventors, &c the Benefit of their Inventions.
2. To procure for the Citizens of the U:S: the full Knowledge,
and Benefit of those Inventions after the Expiration of the period
for which the patent is granted.

164. Id.
165. Id. at 872.
166. See Davison M. Douglas, Foreword: The Legacy of St. George Tucker, 47
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1111, 1112 (2006) (“Tucker was the most significant
legal scholar of the early nineteenth century, particularly after publication
of his five-volume edition of William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the
Laws of England in 1803.”).
167. See Jonathan R. Nash & Michael G. Collins, The Certificate of Division
and the Early Supreme Court, 94 S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3532666
[https://perma.cc/6UBJ-TQ7N].
168. Memorandum from St. George Tucker on Evans v. Jordan and Morehead,
(c. June 7, 1813), in The Papers of John Marshall Digital Edition
(Charles Hobson ed.), https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/
default.xqy?keys=JNML-chron-1810-1813-06-07-2
[https://perma.cc/H3L2-4WTC].
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....
. . . The moment it expired the second Object of the Law
became a matter of Right, to every Citizen of the U:States.169

In Tucker’s view, allowing Evans’s patent to operate against
machines built before 1808 “would have the effect of an Ex post facto
Law . . . And, to punish a Man for exercising a Right legally acquired,
would be a Violation of common Right, which is also contrary to the
Spirit of the C[onstitution of the] U[nited] States.”170
B.

Jefferson and the Baltimore Millers

Even as judges took divergent positions on the balance between
private property and public right, the opponents of Evans’s patent were
making their case in the political realm. By far the most powerful and
organized group resisting Evans were the millers of Baltimore, led by
the wealthy Quaker families, the Tysons and the Ellicotts.171 After
losing a test case against the renewed patent,172 the Baltimore millers
became the inventor’s principal antagonists in Congress and in the
press. By the beginning of 1813, they were petitioning Congress to
reconsider its decision “to let Mr. Evans loose upon the community with
so grievous, so despotic a power.”173
The greatest coup scored by the Baltimore millers was the enlist–
ment of Thomas Jefferson to their cause. In August 1813, one of their
number, Isaac McPherson, wrote to Jefferson in search of prior art in
the library of Monticello: “I am told that thou hast in thy possession a
Book of an old date that has the plates of the screw and elevator at
work in a mill . . . .”174 Jefferson responded with a lengthy letter
assailing Evans’s patent on several fronts. Like Judge Tucker had done
in Evans v. Jordan two months earlier,175 Jefferson sympathized with
the accused infringers’ ex post facto argument. The renewal act, he
thought, was intended to exempt those who built mills before the
restoration of the patent, and should have been construed as such,
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Evans v. Robinson, 8 F. Cas. 886, 886 (C.C.D. Md. 1813) (No. 4,571).
172. Id. at 886–88.
173. Memorial of William Cole and others to Congress (Jan. 1, 1813), reprinted in
Application to Amend the Act Continuing Certain Patent Rights
to Oliver Evans, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 13-354, at 224–25 (2d Sess. 1814).
174. Letter from Isaac McPherson to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 3, 1813), in 6 The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 353–54 (J. Jefferson Looney et al. eds.,
2009).
175. See Memorandum from St. George Tucker, supra note 168.
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especially given the retroactive alternative “being contrary to natural
right.”176
Furthermore, Jefferson continued, Evans’s pretended inventions
were not new. Here Jefferson unleashed his library in full, citing earlier
uses of the bucket elevator and screw conveyer in a long list of classical
and modern texts.177 He conceded only that the “Hopper-boy is an [sic]
useful machine; &, as far as I know, original.”178
Famously, Jefferson then elaborated on the question of patent
property. He rejected the claim “by some (and in England especially)
that inventors have a natural and exclusive right to their inventions.”179
This contention was by now the stock-in-trade of Evans’s lobbying for
his own patent extensions and the rights of inventors generally.180
Echoing arguments familiar from the eighteenth-century British literary
property debates,181 Jefferson pointed to the disconnect between a
natural property right and the fugitive and nonrivalrous nature of
information:
176. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 379 (J. Jefferson Looney et al. eds.,
2009). To be clear, Jefferson made this argument as a matter of statutory
construction, not constitutionality: it was settled law by this time that the
Ex Post Facto clause applied only to criminal law. See Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. 386, 391–93 (1798). With the apparent exception of Judge Tucker,
courts reviewing the Evans Act saw no reason to disturb that premise. See,
e.g., Evans v. Robinson, 8 F. Cas. at 888 (“[T]he act referred to is not an
ex post facto law, for that relates to criminal cases only . . . .”).
177. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 176, at 380–
82.
178. Id. at 382.
179. Id. It is not entirely clear to which English commentators Jefferson was
referring. But with the War of 1812 ongoing, English ideas were presumably
in bad odor.
180. See, e.g., Evans, Useful Improvements, supra note 106, at 6, 9 (“[T]he
United States, was convinced of the good policy of rewarding men for
making useful discoveries . . . by securing for limited times, to authors and
inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”);
Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 147 (“A patent is
a protection of an inherent right for a limited time . . . .”).
181. See, e.g., Millar v. Taylor (1769), 4 Burr. 2303, 2363 (K.B.) (Yates, J.,
dissenting) (“But how can an author, after publishing his work, confine it
to himself? If he had kept the manuscript from publication, he might have
excluded all the world from participating with him, or knowing the
sentiments it contained: but by publishing the work, the whole was laid
open; every sentiment in it made public, for ever; and the author can never
recall them to himself, never more confine them to himself, and keep them
subject to his own dominion. . . . So, from the time of publication, the ideas
become incapable of being any longer a subject of property: all mankind are
equally intitled [sic] to read them; and every reader becomes as fully
possessed of all the ideas, as the author himself ever was.”).
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[I]t would be curious then if an idea, the fugitive fermentation of
an individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed in
exclusive and stable property. [I]f nature has made any one thing
less susceptible, than all others, of exclusive property, it is the
action of the thinking power called an Idea; which an individual
may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the
moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every
one, and the reciever [sic] cannot dispossess himself of it . . . . [H]e
who recieves an idea from me, recieves instruction himself,
without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine,
recieves light without darkening me . . . . [I]nventions then
cannot in nature be a subject of property. [S]ociety may give an
exclusive right to the profits arising from them as an
encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce
utility.182

As Jeremy Sheff has argued, it would be a mistake (albeit an oftmade one) to see Jefferson’s letter as a declaration that consequen–
tialism alone underlay early American thinking about patents.183
Jefferson’s ideas about creation and ownership remained embedded in
a worldview that privileged natural rights.184 This much is evident in
Jefferson’s treatment of the Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans: he did
not criticize it on grounds of utility—say, because it gave an
unnecessary windfall to an inventor or constrained the development of
the industry—but insisted that it should be treated as a law “abridging
the natural rights of the citizen,” in keeping with Americans’ nearuniversal “sentiment that ex post facto laws are against natural
right.”185 Like Judge Tucker in Evans v. Jordan, Jefferson saw the
limited-time patent bargain as vesting rights in both the inventor and
the public. And as with Evans’s own fluid switching between welfarist
and natural-rights arguments in pursuit of greater protection,
Jefferson’s letter to McPherson shows that the two frames were not
mutually exclusive.
Jefferson’s letter soon became the centerpiece of the Baltimore
millers’ ongoing attempts to repeal or modify Evans’s act.186 Their

182. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 176, at 383.
183. See Sheff, supra note 153, at 303–06.
184. Id. at 305–06, 313 (arguing that Jefferson drew the metaphor of the taper
from Cicero and that his views were accordingly grounded in a classical
natural rights tradition).
185. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 176, at
379.
186. See Memorial to Congress of Sundry Citizens Praying Relief from the
Oppressive Operation of Oliver Evans’ Patent, Niles’ Wkly. Reg., Feb.

478

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020
Oliver Evans and the Framing of American Patent Law

efforts made some headway in Congress. A Senate committee chaired
by Maryland’s Samuel Smith, a former mayor of Baltimore, reported in
favor of a bill to amend the act, endorsing the millers’ arguments that
Evans’s inventions were not new at the time of his original patent and
that Evans had “abused the power vested in him” by the renewal.187
But a House committee led by Representative Charles Ingersoll of
Philadelphia—Evans’s own base of operations—rejected the millers’
memorial, observing that “[t]he patentee, by law, has an exclusive
privilege to use his invention as he pleases. No person has a right to
complain if the proprietor of an invention demands a sum deemed
exorbitant, more than if such a demand had been made for any other
species of property.”188
For his part, Oliver Evans responded to the clash of 1813–14 by
rising to his polemical peak. In the press, his pamphlet-length response
to Jefferson’s letter was entitled “A Trip Made by a Small Man in a
Wrestle with a Very Great Man.”189 Jefferson, he argued, had the
argument from natural law precisely backward: no private property in
land or animals existed in the state of nature without an act of
appropriation and possession, “[b]ut a man’s ideas and inventions, are,
by natural law, his own exclusive property; he need show no act to vest
the property in him so long as he keeps them secret to himself.”190 Most
of the tract was devoted to score-settling with various millers and
telling his own sympathetic story, but Evans returned to his broader
arguments about the patent system, recapitulating his theme of the
suffering inventor and proposing that Congress adopt a twenty-eightyear patent term.191
Meanwhile, Evans pressed his own case again directly to Congress.
“[I]n behalf of himself and the patentees in the United States” he
pleaded for the relief of the oppressed class of inventors, “so few in
number, that they are never represented in legislation,” and subject “to

28, 1814 (Addenda to Vol. V), at 1 (enclosing as exhibit No. I the letter
from Jefferson).
187. Amendment Proposed to the Act Continuing Certain Patent
Rights to Oliver Evans, S. Doc. No. 13-365, at 238 (2d Sess. 1814).
188. Application to Amend the Act Continuing Certain Patent Rights
to Oliver Evans, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 13-354, at 224 (2d Sess. 1814).
189. Oliver Evans, Letter to the Editor, A Trip Made by a Small Man in a Wrestle
with a Very Great Man, Niles’ Wkly. Reg., Feb. 28, 1814 (Second
Addenda to Vol. V), at 1 (1814).
190. Id. at 1.
191. Id. at 12.
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the frauds and jeers of knaves and wags, to deprivations and poverty.”192
Again the appeal to property as a guidestar was a principal theme. Any
man who discovered a piece of “unlocated land” could seek a land
patent, “and on paying the public for their right to the soil, it is secured
to him, his heirs and assigns forever.”193 Furthermore, the landowner
could invest in improving his land, “building mills, furnaces, forges,
bridges, roads, canals, &c. for their own and the public benefit,” all of
which would be impossible if his term of ownership were only fourteen
years.194 Compared to a patentee of “easily found” land, an inventor
was more deserving—but “we have heard no good reason assigned why
protection to them should be extended to 14 years only, while all other
classes are protected in the exclusive right to the fruits of their labor
forever.”195
As usual, Evans’s arguments were not solely addressed to the
inventor’s private benefit. This time, he seized on current events and
interwove his property analogies with a quite different proposition: a
fiscal case designed to appeal to Congress at a time when the War of
1812 strained the federal government’s resources and had forced the
adoption of new direct taxes.196 Evans fleshed out the idea in a further
memorial to Congress, claiming rather optimistically that a
combination of extended patent terms and royalties paid to the
government would soon generate an explosion of invention and revenues
“sufficient to free the people from taxation.”197
The remaining piece in Evans’s literary output of 1813–14 was one
of the more extraordinary publications about the early-nineteenthcentury patent system. On its face, Patent Right Oppression Exposed;
Or, Knavery Detected was a vicious attack on Evans: it was subtitled
“In An Address, to Unite All Good People to Obtain a Repeal of the
Patent Laws” and dedicated “to the right, the honest millers
throughout the United States.”198 In fact, the book was a work of epic
sarcasm. Its centerpiece was an eighty-page poem, attributed to
“Patrick N. I. Elisha, Esq., Poet Laureate,” a pseudonym swiping at

192. Letter from Oliver Evans to the Honorable the Senators, and the
Representatives in Congress, individually (Jan. 7, 1814), reprinted in Niles’
Wkly. Reg., Feb. 28, 1814 (Second Addenda to Vol. V), at 14 (1814).
193. Id. at 14.
194. Id. at 14.
195. Id. at 15.
196. Id. at 15.
197. Letter from Oliver Evans to the Congres [sic] of the United States, each
honorable member individually (Feb. 5, 1814), reprinted in Nat’l
Intelligencer, Feb. 22, 1814, at 2095.
198. Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at A2.
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the millers’ ringleader, Elisha Tyson.199 For page after page, the supp–
osed poet complained about “the law of patent-right / Whose nature is
to make friends fight,”200 and damned Oliver Evans as an “avaricious,
crazy-pated prig”201 and “the most selfish varlet, / That e’er was born
of any harlot.”202 Meanwhile Evans’s own voice spoke from the
footnotes, acidly pointing out the errors of the millers, telling the story
of his own life and inventions, and rehashing his successful infringement
litigation.203 After a wild climax to the poem, in which Evans was
depicted (by himself, remember) as a devilish imp cavorting with Satan,
scantily-clad witches, and assorted hags who “show’d their shankies as
they rompt,”204 the volume turned into a collection of Evans’s petitions,
publications, and autobiographical sketches.
In addition to compiling many of the political and polemical
arguments described above, these documents included an essay in which
Evans did something few had attempted at that point: describe the
principles of U.S. patent law.205 American patent jurisprudence was still
unformed. As of 1813, only a handful of patent cases had been reported
(though more had been litigated), only one of them by the U.S. Supreme
Court.206 The first American patent treatise, published in 1810 by the
New England lawyer and writer Thomas Green Fessenden, was based
mostly on English cases.207 Evans, while admitting that he was not
learned in law, prepared his Reflections on the Patent Law as “useful
information to inventors and patentees.”208 He wrote of the nature of
novelty under the Patent Act,209 of the scope of patents for “original
discoveries” and follow-on inventions,210 and of the definition of prior

199. Id. at unpaginated front material.
200. Id. at 4.
201. Id. at A2.
202. Id. at 17.
203. Id. at 2–9.
204. Id. at 78–81.
205. Reflections on the Patent Law, in Elisha, Patent Right Oppression,
supra note 13, at 132, 132–48.
206. See Walterscheid, supra note 84, at 362 & nn.26–30 (finding six reported
patent decisions before 1810); Tyler v. Tuel, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 324 (1810).
On unreported litigation, see Beauchamp, supra note 10, at 670.
207. Thomas G. Fessenden, An Essay on the Law of Patents for New
Inventions 42 (Boston, D. Mallory & Co. 1810).
208. Elisha, Patent Right Oppression, supra note 13, at 148.
209. Id. at 136–40.
210. Id. at 140.
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art211—all subjects in which he had a rooting interest, but at the same
time all genuinely fluid questions in early American patent law.
This would be a front on which Evans fought for the remainder of
his life. Having gained and regained his rights through the executive
and Congress, he now had to define and defend his patent in the courts
just as they labored to work out the details of the law.

IV. Oliver Evans and the Making of
American Patent Law
It is hard to overstate the scale, by early-nineteenth-century
standards, of Evans’s patent enforcement efforts in the 1810s. In an age
when law and business were both intensely local, small-scale affairs,
Evans had lawyers and agents on commission going county by county,
mill by mill in multiple states, documenting use of his patented
invention, charging license fees, and filing infringement suits. At a time
when there were few suits in federal court at all and only a smattering
of patent cases, Evans brought so many that he had to create a form
complaint for his attorneys and instruct them not by private
correspondence but by printed circular.212
The courts were forced to work through some basic conceptions and
doctrines of patent law both in and by Evans’s cases. Judges wrestled
with practical issues of as-yet-unformed patent doctrine, including how
strictly to apply the requirements of validity and how to understand
the scope of Evans’s rights at a time before patents contained formal
claims. These problems also implicated the law’s contested relationship
to English patent jurisprudence and practice. Oliver Evans did not
make the law to his liking—indeed, he died bitterly angry about how
he had been treated by the courts, three years before the Supreme Court
finally invalidated his rights213—but it was partly through his inventions
that American patent law took shape.
A.

Litigation Machine

Evans’s patent assertion campaign rested on relentless enforcement.
His agents in the 1810s were each instructed “to travel through a part
of the United States, and to visit every flour mill.”214 In the summer of
1814, for example, Evans’s brother Joseph traversed five New York
211. Id. at 141–44.
212. See Federico, supra note 94, at 673. See generally, Evans, Oliver Evans
to His Counsel, supra note 20 (writing to his counsel to aid them in defense
of his patent rights).
213. Federico, supra note 94, at 681; Ferguson, supra note 11, at 53.
214. Deposition of Joseph Evans, Evans v. Masier, (C.C.S.D.N.Y. October 1816),
on file at Law Case Files 1790–1846, National Archives at New York City.
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counties in search of unlicensed users of Evans’s machinery, ultimately
demanding licenses from twenty-four millers in amounts ranging from
$50 to $1,350.215 By then, Joseph was one of at least seven regional
agents operating in the mid-Atlantic states.216 Yet the larger the effort
to secure licenses, the more resistance Oliver Evans encountered. By
1817, he employed “fifteen of the most eminent counsel” to conduct
litigation and found his own time “wholly engrossed by law suits.”217
The total number of suits filed by Evans in the 1810s is unknown,
stashed away in the dockets and files of individual federal courts.218 A
few visible parts of the campaign suggest litigation on a large scale:
indices of court archives show more than 200 suits filed in Virginia
between 1811 and 1823;219 more than thirty in Philadelphia;220 and
another twenty-nine in the Southern District of New York,221 to name
but a few of the jurisdictions in which Evans was active. Repeat
litigation against hundreds of individual defendants was a feature of the
nineteenth-century patent system.222 But the practice did not generally
emerge until the 1830s;223 Evans anticipated this development by
decades.
An enforcement campaign of this scale required organization.
Unlike in steam engineering, where he both patented his inventions and
established a leading manufacturing works,224 Evans was always a “nonpracticing” patentee when it came to the milling patent. His network
of agents had a dual mandate to enforce his patent and to promote
(though not construct) his technology, demanding licenses where they
215. Id.
216. See Letter from Oliver Evans to the Millers of the United States (Dec. 30,
1809), https://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.1510150b/?sp=1 [https://perma
.cc/4RHP-7EC9] (naming regional agents).
217. Evans, Oliver Evans to His Counsel, supra note 20, at 46.
218. These sources could be consulted in normal times, but at the time of
writing are inaccessible due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
219. 7 The Papers of John Marshall: April 1807–December 1813, at 404
(Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1993) (citing U.S. Circuit Court for Virginia,
Index to Ended Cases 1790–1860).
220. See National Archives, Law and Appellate Records of the U.S. Circuit Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1790–1847, Microfilm Publication
M969 (listing filed suits by plaintiff).
221. Database of patent suits filed in the U.S. Circuit Court for the Southern
District of New York, on file with author.
222. See Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125
Yale L.J. 848, 848 (2016).
223. Id. at 860–62 (describing the emergence of litigation campaigns in the
1830s and 1840s).
224. See Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 139.
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found his system in operation and encouraging its adoption where it
was not already used.225 The enforcement effort was centrally managed
but locally entrepreneurial: Evans financed and oversaw litigation,
while his agents worked for a commission based on the value of licenses
and interest.226 Lawsuits were a calculated cost of the business model.
In an 1817 letter ordering substantial payments to his counsel in
Philadelphia and NYC for litigation-related expenses, Evans explained
that “we must continue to risk 100$ to recover $10,000.”227 Some cases
resulted in substantial damages: Evans reported one case where demand
for a $40 license ended with recovered damages of $2,148.228 But the
principal objective of suing was to bring recalcitrant millers into line
and secure their acquiescence in licensing.229
The growing organization of Evans’s enforcement effort contrasted
with the underdeveloped state of the patent law itself. Supreme Court
Justice Joseph Story found the law wholly “vague and unsettled” when
he first took the bench in 1811,230 and the nascent patent jurisprudence
that emerged over the next decade consisted mostly of his own reported
decisions on circuit in Massachusetts and others from Justice Bushrod
Washington in Pennsylvania.231 The Supreme Court decided its first
patent case in 1810, a dispute about an assignee’s right to sue.232 The
next four cases decided at the high court were Evans v. Jordan233 in

225. Deposition of Joseph Evans, supra note 214.
226. See, e.g., Letter from John Moody to Thomas Jefferson (October 20, 1808)
(on file with the National Archives), https://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-8907 [https://perma.cc/JD93-HD7X] (off–
ering a license and explaining his commission as an employee of Oliver
Evans).
227. Letter from Oliver Evans to David Muhlenberg (December 20, 1817),
reprinted in Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 259 (noting payments of
$200 and $1,000 to Evans’s attorneys).
228. Letter from Oliver Evans to Daniel Woods (April 5, 1817), reprinted in
Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 243.
229. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph Evans to Oliver Evans (April 8, 1816),
reprinted in Bathe & Bathe, supra note 1, at 231 (approving selection of a
particular litigation target on the grounds that “if you will defeat him, the
whole state will pay you”).
230. Joseph Story, 1 Life and Letters of Joseph Story 237 (William W.
Story ed., Boston, Little & Brown 1851).
231. See Walterscheid, supra note 84, at 359 (noting that the two justices
were among the first to have their circuit opinions reported and together
accounted for forty out of the fifty-eight cases reported or referenced from
the circuits before 1835).
232. Tyler v. Tuel, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 324 (1810).
233. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199 (1815).

484

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020
Oliver Evans and the Framing of American Patent Law

1815, Evans v. Eaton234 in 1818, Evans v. Eaton235 again in 1822, and
Evans v. Hettich236 in the same year. It is perhaps not surprising that
Evans’s cases reached the Supreme Court when other patents did not.
No other patent of the time equaled the milling patent’s combination
of large financial stakes and widespread enforcement. But it meant that
Evans’s rights arrived at the Court with every issue they presented
being a matter of first impression for that body.
B.

Oliver Evans and the Principles of Patent Law

The first Supreme Court case dealt with an issue peculiar to Evans.
The appeal of Evans v. Jordan, Chief Justice Marshall’s decision on
circuit upholding Evans’s rights against infringers who erected their
mills before the congressional renewal,237 came before the whole Court
in 1815. In a brief disposition, the unanimous Court affirmed Marshall’s
conclusion as a matter of statutory construction, finding the act “free
from all ambiguity” in protecting only activity prior to the date of the
renewal.238 For our purposes, the most salient aspect of the decision may
be what it did not say: Justice Bushrod Washington’s opinion made no
mention of Marshall’s “inchoate right” language; in fact it employed
none of the language of property, natural rights, or public right that
had occupied Evans or his adversaries below.239 The decision set a tone
that others would follow: the Supreme Court’s Evans cases did not
engage in deep musing about the nature of the patent right, but instead
focused on the practical implementation of the law.
Practical questions were fundamental, though. For example, the
Evans cases forced the Court to consider what made an invention
“new”—or more precisely, what qualified as prior art that would inval–
idate a patent. This was a question that the everyday administration
of the 1793 Patent Act did not answer, since the statute allowed any
applicant to receive a patent with no prior examination for novelty.240
The Act left it for litigation to invalidate a patent for an invention that
was “originally” discovered, used, or described before the patentee’s
invention.241 American courts only began to define these terms in a
234. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454 (1818).
235. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
236. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 453 (1822).
237. See supra notes 159–1170 and accompanying text.
238. Evans v. Jordan, 13 U.S. at 202.
239. The defendants did argue these points to the Court. See id. at 201.
240. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318–21 (requiring no inves–
tigation before the Secretary of State could issue a patent).
241. Id. § 6, 1 Stat. at 322 (invalidity where the invention “was not originally
discovered by the patentee, but had been in use, or had been described in
some public work anterior to the supposed discovery”); id. § 10, at 323
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systematic way in the 1810s.242 Evans’s patent presented a rich
environment for doing so, thanks to his opponents mounting a lengthy
effort to find machines that purportedly anticipated the components of
his system,243 and Evans resisting on the grounds that those machines
were obscure, ineffective, or abandoned.
The Supreme Court generally resolved these questions of novelty in
ways we would find familiar now, holding that if earlier uses of Evans’s
technology were proved, they would invalidate his patent. But that
does not mean the Court’s conclusions were uncontestable at the time.
Among other arguments that would seem off-the-wall today, Evans’s
attorneys contended that a prior use could not invalidate a patent when
the inventor was unaware of it.244 Pushing back still further against
obscure prior art, they argued that prior use of an invention could not
invalidate a patent unless the older machine was useful enough to
receive a patent of its own.245 For good measure, they argued that that
challenges to the validity of Evans’s patent were statutorily foreclosed
by both the Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans246 and by the Patent
Act’s hazily understood provision for suits to repeal an invalid grant,
which limited affirmative challenges to the first three years of a patent’s
life.247 None of these contentions prevailed, but Evans’s assertions about
prior art were not necessarily challenging well-settled U.S. law. Other
litigants at the time similarly argued that prior use would only
(permitting an action to repeal the patent where “the patentee was not the
true inventor or discoverer”).
242. See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 514 (1818) (determining
that the words “originally discovered” make void any subsequent patent,
even if the patentee had no knowledge of the prior discovery).
243. See id. at 472–73; Memorial to Congress of Sundry Citizens Praying Relief
from the Oppressive Operation of Oliver Evans’ Patent, supra note 186,
at 1–2.
244. See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 846, 850 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 4,559)
(reporting counsel’s distinction between a “first” discovery and an “original”
discovery under which “[i]t is not necessary that the plaintiff should be the
first discoverer, if he was a real bona fide discoverer, without knowing that
a similar discovery had previously been made”). Evans’s lawyers later
retreated from this position, claiming they meant only that prior use did
not count if it was private or secret. See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. at 502.
245. See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. at 487–88 (reporting counsel’s argument that
“[t]he useful thing patented prevails over one, not useful nor patented,
though in previous partial existence”).
246. See id. at 486 (reporting counsel’s claim that “[t]he special act is an absolute
grant to him, binding on all the community, and precluding any inquiry
into the originality of the invention”).
247. See Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 846, 855 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 4,559); see
also Beauchamp, supra note 10, at 674 (noting confusion over the meaning
of the repeal provision).
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anticipate a later patent if it were widely known or adopted.248 Only
with Justice Story’s influential decision to the contrary in Bedford v.
Hunt249 (1817) and Justice Washington’s jury charge in the 1816 trial
of Evans v. Eaton250 was this idea officially rebuffed in the circuit courts.
The Supreme Court’s first decision in Evans v. Eaton confirmed that
even where “the patentee had no knowledge of this previous use or
previous description; still his patent is void.”251
The greatest doctrinal legacy of the Evans cases came in the law of
patent claiming. Numerous commentators have seen Evans v. Eaton
(1822) as a foundational moment for the emergence of the claim as a
defining feature of the patent.252 The requirement that a patentee
should include one or more explicit claims identifying the protected
invention did not enter the statute until 1836,253 but it followed judicial
developments among which Evans v. Eaton was central.
Again, the special circumstances of Evans’s grant pushed the courts
to grapple with the indeterminacies of the law. As issued in 1808, the
Evans patent included a kind of claim, but not in any format that one
would recognize today.254 The specification identified two “principles”—
one for powering the milling process from the motive power of the mill
248. See, e.g., Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 38 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217)
(“It has been argued by the plaintiff, that the defence [sic] set up by the
statute does not apply, except in cases, where the invention . . . has been
before generally known and in general use, among persons engaged in the
art or profession, to which it properly belongs.”).
249. Id.; see also Thomas Green Fessenden, An Essay on the Law of
Patents for New Inventions 58–59 (Boston, Charles Ewer, 2d ed. 1822)
(citing Bedford as the source of principles recognized in Evans v. Eaton).
250. 8 F. Cas. 846, 853 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 4,559).
251. Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. at 513–14.
252. See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 Mich. L. Rev.
523, 540 (2010) (footnote omitted) (“[From Evans and similar cases, the
requirement of explicit claims arose . . . .”); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic
and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents and Claiming the Future, Part I
(1790–1870), 87 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 371, 383–85 (2005)
(calling the case “seminal”); Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S.
Patents, 20 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 134, 148 (1938) (noting that Evans v.
Eaton “accelerated the development of the claim”). But see John F. Duffy,
The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of
Patents, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 273, 309 n.111 (2002) (noting that claims did
not originate with Evans v. Eaton and often did not conform to the
instructions of that decision).
253. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (requiring the patentee to
“particularly specify and point out the part, improvement, or combination,
which he claims as his own invention or discovery”).
254. The original patent is lost, but a copy of the text appears in the report of
Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. at 461–71.
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rather than manually, and the other for keeping the meal in constant
motion as it was ground, bolted, and dried—and claimed “[t]he
application of those principles . . . as my invention.”255 The patent then
listed a numbered series of machines for carrying them out: the elevator,
conveyer, hopperboy, drill, and kiln-drier.256 Of the hopperboy, Evans
added that he claimed “as my invention, the peculiar properties or
principles which this machine possesses.”257 The patent’s distinction
between principle and application tracked the language of the 1793
Patent Act, which instructed a patentee to “fully explain the principle
[of his machine], and the several modes in which he has contemplated
the application of that principle.”258 But the statute gave courts little
instruction on how to translate the patentee’s descriptions into the
scope of the right.
The alleged infringement in Evans v. Eaton turned not on the use
of Evans’s system as a whole, but on the use of just one machine, the
hopperboy. At trial in the circuit court, Justice Washington saw no
infringement, holding that the patent covered the complete system, not
its individual components.259 The Supreme Court reversed, with Chief
Justice Marshall apparently torn over the question, but concluding that
the act of Congress restoring Evans’s rights was meant to protect all of
the inventor’s machines separately.260
On remand, the scope of Evans’s rights once again proved
problematic, but now as a matter of validity. If the hopperboy were a
protected invention in its own right, Washington reasoned, then Evans
had to explain the difference between his “improved” hopperboy and
the relevant prior art: in this instance a form of mechanical hopperboy
allegedly operated by one Christian Stouffer and his family in the 1770s
and early 1780s.261 The lack of any distinguishing claim was fatal.
Evans’s “patent for an improvement is void,” Washington instructed
255. Id. at 464–65.
256. Id. at 465–69.
257. Id. at 468.
258. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321–22.
259. Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 846, 854 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 4,559) (charging
jury as follows: “But is the exclusive right to the hopperboy granted by this
patent? It certainly is not, although this machine constitutes a part of the
improvement of which the plaintiff was the original discoverer, and it is for
that improvement, and that only, for which the grant is made.”).
260. Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. at 506–07. Marshall wrote apologetically to
Washington that he and his colleagues believed the Evans act to authorize
“a much greater latitude than is authorized by the general patent law.”
Letter from John Marshall to Bushrod Washington (Oct. 28, 1818),
reprinted in 8 The Papers of John Marshall: March 1814–December
1819, at 200 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 2014).
261. Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 856, 857–60 (C.C.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 4,560).
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the jury, “because the nature and extent of his improvement are not
stated in his specification.”262
On this point Washington was working hand in glove with the
leading American authority on patents, Justice Joseph Story. Story had
recently announced on circuit that a patent that “mixes up the old and
the new, and does not distinctly ascertain for which, in particular, the
patent is claimed . . . must be void.”263 If such a patent meant to include
the old, he argued, it was invalid for claiming more broadly than the
invention; if it did not, it was invalid for failing to inform the court and
the public of its scope.264 Story then took the opportunity of Evans v.
Eaton, as the first case of patent validity to reach the Supreme Court,
to write a “Note on the Patent Laws,” which appeared as an appendix
to the case in the official Reports.265 The Note stressed this same point
repeatedly and in stern italics.266
Evans v. Eaton’s second visit to the Supreme Court, in 1822,
established the doctrine for the Court as a whole. Justice Story’s
opinion confirmed that an act of distinguishing the invention from the
prior art was “indispensable,”267 both to enable scrutiny of the patent’s
novelty and to give notice to the public of its scope.268 The decision
delivered the coup de grace to Evans’s patent, which was “defective in
not specifying that improvement.”269
Evans v. Eaton was not the origin of the patent law’s distinct
claiming requirement,270 just the moment when it acquired the
imprimatur of the Supreme Court. It would be wrong, though, to think
that the case merely ratified conventional wisdom. The 1822 decision
was neither inevitable nor a product of consensus on the Court. In an

262. Id. at 859.
263. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1020 (C.C.D. Ma. 1817) (No. 8,568); see
also Lutz, supra note 252, at 138–39 (describing earlier rulings by Story to
similar effect).
264. Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1020.
265. See Joseph Story, Note on the Patent Laws, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) app. 13, at
27 (1818) (referring to Eaton as “the principal case in the text” to which
the Note was attached).
266. See id. at 25, 27 (reiterating that “if the invention is definitively described
in the patent and specification, so as to distinguish it from other inventions
before known, the patent is good”).
267. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 434–35 (1822).
268. Id. at 434.
269. Id. at 435.
270. See, e.g., Story, supra note 265, at 21–22, 27 (citing Story’s earlier decisions
and English antecedents).

489

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020
Oliver Evans and the Framing of American Patent Law

era of relatively few dissents, the case split the justices 4–3.271 Justice
Livingston’s dissent lamented that Story’s decision would have “a very
extensive, if not a disastrous bearing on many other patents for
improvements, and will in fact amount to a repeal of many of them.”272
To invalidate “a patent for a highly useful improvement” like Evans’s
was “a very high penalty, and should not be lightly inflicted, unless
rendered absolutely necessary by law.”273
Behind the dissenters’ concern for the reliance interests of existing
patentees lay a larger dispute over sources of authority in American
patent law. Story’s impulse in his early patent law writings (and in his
jurisprudence generally) was to draw on English law.274 The approach
that he and Washington took of the patent specification rested on their
view of the English cases.275 By contrast, the dissenters in Evans v.
Eaton urged their brethren to be “extremely cautious in adopting the
rules which have been introduced into other countries, and under laws
not in every respect like our own.”276 The English cases “which . . . seem
to have been implicitly followed in this country” almost all post-dated
the Revolution, were mostly subsequent to the American patent acts,
and were “made on a British act of Parliament very unlike our own.”277
In particular, English decisions invalidating patents for defective
specifications were “not of authority.”278 The back-and-forth struggle
over Story’s anglicizing patent law was a recurring theme of the 1820s,
with the question of how strict American law should be in invalidating
patents being constantly unsettled as a result.279
Oliver Evans did not live to see his patent felled in 1822 by the
rising strain of English strictness in patent doctrine. He had died in
1819, his health declining rapidly after fire gutted his prized engineering
271. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. at 435, 452.
272. Id. at 436 (Livingston, J. dissenting).
273. Id. at 448.
274. See R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story:
Statesman of the Old Republic 139–40 (1985); Frank D. Prager, The
Changing Views of Justice Story on the Construction of Patents, 4 Am. J.
Legal Hist. 1, 10–11 (1960).
275. See Story, supra note 265, at 21–23; Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 856, 860
(C.C.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 4,560).
276. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. at 439 (Livingston, J. dissenting).
277. Id.
278. Id. at 451.
279. See, e.g., Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 6, 9, 18 (1829) (arguments
of counsel and opinion of the Court on the applicability of English
precedent); McGaw v. Bryan, 16 F. Cas. 96, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1821) (No. 8,793)
(ridiculing the appeal to English authority as a “magic influence”); see also
Beauchamp, supra note 10, at 681–82; Prager, supra note 274, at 11.
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works—one last consignment of his inventions to the flames.280 Yet the
inventor made an appearance in his last case. Counsel for the patentee,
attempting to tack away from the problem of defining an “improve–
ment” patent, worked instead to compare Evans to the archetypal great
inventors of the day, men whose patents had likewise been central to
their personal mythologies. “Upon what ground, then, can it be said
that he is not an original inventor, when [James] Watt was solemnly
adjudged, and [Robert] Fulton unanimously allowed to be so?”281
Brilliant, frustrated, querulous, and prideful as he was, Oliver Evans
himself could not have asked the question any better.

Conclusion
The life of Oliver Evans encompassed all the highs and lows of the
patent system in the early Republic. From these events, one can—and
Evans did—tell a story of weak patents, in which widespread piracy,
public indifference, and legal uncertainty combined to leave the
patentee helpless and frustrated. At the same time, Evans’s career
included legislative support from both states and the national govern–
ment, federal courts that enforced his rights in hundreds of suits across
multiple jurisdictions, and a model of patent assertion that enabled the
inventor to specialize and invest in further invention and innovation.
Whether the early U.S. patent system delivered consistently on its
promises of protection is a subject for another day. For now, suffice to
say that Evans experienced all the contradictions of early American
patent law.
First, more than any other inventor, he participated in the full
variety of patent systems in the new United States, above all by
traversing both the state and federal patent regimes. Yet his experience
suggests more continuity across the great 1790 divide than is generally
recognized. With their common basis in the practice of petitioning for
government assistance, state legislative grants were more bureaucratic
and early federal patents more irregular than one might expect. When
we seek to reconstruct the conceptual world of the early patent system,
the creation of a general national patent statute may not have been the
sharp break that is often assumed.
Second, Evans’s role as a polemicist reveals underappreciated
nuance in the discourse of patent rights. Although Evans was both the
leading campaigner for stronger patent rights in the early Republic and
the leading advocate of a natural-property conception of the patent, the
debates around his rights do not easily reduce to the “privilege versus
property” framework of recent years. The early nineteenth century had
a greater range of frames for discussing patents and patentees, including
not only arguments based on utility and property but also those
280. Federico, supra note 94, at 681.
281. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. at 412.
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founded on compensation and relief. And the supposedly foundational
statements of patent philosophy that appeared around Evans’s rights,
such as Marshall’s decision in Evans v. Jordan and Jefferson’s denial
that patent rights arose from a natural property right, are on closer
inspection revealed to be less clear cut than modern commentators
assume.
Third, Evans, the man most aggrieved by the decisions of the early
federal courts in patent matters, was also a major spur to their work.
The volume and controversy of his litigation, the confusing construction
of his patent document, and the unusual context of his legislative
extension all forced judges to work out—and gave them the opportunity
to declare—what would later become basic principles of American
patent law. That Evans died disgusted with their decisions even before
the Supreme Court finally invalidated his patent in 1822 is a good
reminder to be careful what you ask for.
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